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Abstract
This paper quantifies the gains from infrastructure investments and shows that reshaping
the highway network after a large economic shock, the division of Germany, had positive
welfare and income effects. To address the endogeneity between infrastructure and economic
outcomes, I develop a multi-region quantitative trade model where infrastructure is chosen by
the government to maximise welfare. I calibrate the model to the prewar German economy and
estimate the key structural parameter of the model using the prewar Highway Plan. I exploit the
division of Germany, a large-scale exogenous shock to economic fundamentals, to show that the
model can predict changes in highway construction after the division. Using newly collected
data, I document that half of the new highway investments deviated from the prewar Highway
Plan. I find that the reallocation of these investments (one-third of the network) increased
real income by 0.69% to 2% each year, compared to the construction of the original prewar
Plan. Finally, I find a large cost of path-dependence: the ability to reshape the full network in
anticipation of the division could have increased real income by an additional 1.85%.
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1 Introduction
Governments throughout the world spend large amounts of money on extending and upgrading
transportation infrastructure. For example, both the United States and the European Union devote
an annual share of GDP to infrastructure expenditures that is close to expenses on Defense.1 In
addition to being costly, infrastructure projects are extremely long-lived: the average lifespan of a
highway is around twenty years, the lifespan of a railway or an airport is over forty years.2 This
raises the question of whether governments can adjust transportation infrastructure to unexpected
economic changes and how large are the aggregate costs of not being able to do so.
In this paper, I analyse whether governments can adapt transport infrastructure to changes in
the economic environment and to what extent the lack of flexibility to do so can lead to inefficient
outcomes. I exploit a historical episode of unexpected change in borders that affected the incentives
to build domestic transport infrastructure: the division of Germany in 1949. Figure 1 shows how
borders were reorganized at the end of the Second World War. The former German territory,
enclosed in the thick black line, was divided into West Germany (dark grey area), East Germany
(light grey area) and the easternmost territories (white area), that were integrated into Poland and
the Soviet Union. In Germany, the construction of the highway network had started a few years
before the onset of the War. As Figure 1 shows, the new border cut across some of the recently
completed highways (black lines). To understand how the division affected highway allocation in
West Germany, I develop a quantitative spatial trade model with endogenous infrastructure choice.
I take the model to historical data of Germany in the 1930s and use it to answer two questions.
First, I study the allocation of highways in West Germany in the years after the division. I find that
post-division highways were build to adapt the network to the new geography. Counterfactuals
reveal that the flexibility to complete the network after the division created welfare gains of 1.24%
to 1.86%. Second, I analyse how the highways built before division, represented as black lines
in Figure 1, affected the overall efficiency of the network. My findings suggest that these initial
investments conditioned the construction of future highways due to path-dependence. I show that
this path-dependence from past investments led to an aggregate welfare level 1.8% lower than the
unconstrained highway network.
The division of Germany in 1949 provides two important advantages to study whether govern-
ments can adapt transport infrastructure to unexpected changes. First, it allows us to observe a
1The U.S. government spends 2.3% of GDP on Infrastructure while spending 3.3% on Defense and in the European
Union governments spend on average 1.9% of GDP on infrastructure while devoting only 1.3% to Defense.
2https://transportgeography.org/?pageid = 5423
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large-scale shock that redefined the incentives to allocate infrastructure. The division of Germany
separated a previously well-integrated territory for exogenous reasons, disrupting trade and mi-
gration across the new border (Redding and Sturm, 2008). Second, the government faced some
rigidity that did not allow for a complete reallocation of the network after the shock. As shown
in Figure 1, a large part of the highway network was built before the division. These pre-division
highways survived many years after the division and created a constraint for the new West German
government.
Figure 1: The division of Germany and the highway network in 1939
Notes: The figure displays West Germany (dark grey) and the former German territories of East Germany,
Prussia and East Prussia (light gray). The highways built by the year 1939 are depicted as black lines. Source:
Created by the author from newly digitised historical data.
Using digitised historical maps, I document that the West German highway network was
transformed by the division shock. Germany had started highway construction in 1934 following a
6000-kilometres highway Plan.3 By the start of the Second World War, half of the planned kilometres
had been built. Using digitised maps of the highway network, I compare actual construction in
3This highway plan, while commissioned by Hitler, was heavily influenced by earlier proposals to build a German
highway network
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the data with the prewar highway Plan. I document that, before division, highways were built
according to the prewar highway Plan without deviation. However, after division, only half of the
new highways were built after the prewar Plan. The other half, around 1500 kilometres, deviated
from the original design. This considerable reshaping of the highway network suggests that the
West German government reacted to the change caused by the division.
To understand how the division of Germany may have affected the government’s incentives to
reshape infrastructure, I develop a quantitative spatial trade model with endogenous infrastructure
investments. In the model, trade happens across many regions that are linked through the transport
network. Each region has an exogenous productivity level and local firms produce a set of differen-
tiated varieties as in Krugman (1980). Infrastructure improvements along a group of regions reduce
the shipping costs between these regions, facilitating consumption of non-local varieties. Workers
decide where to live and how much to consume to maximise their indirect utility, giving rise to a
spatial equilibrium structure (Redding, 2016). This framework builds on the quantitative spatial
models surveyed by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017). I extend this standard framework by
including a government that chooses how to invest in infrastructure to maximise aggregate welfare.
The model nests a spatial equilibrium into the government’s maximisation problem and can
be solved backwards. First, given the initial transport network, the matrix of bilateral transport
costs is determined by applying the least-cost path algorithm to all region-pairs. With the bilateral
transport costs and the initial parameter values, the spatial equilibrium is given by the vector of
wages, labour allocations, prices and rents for which the equilibrium conditions hold. The spatial
equilibrium determines the expected utility of the economy that is used as a proxy for aggregate
welfare (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). Finally, the government chooses the infrastructure
investment allocation that maximises aggregate welfare, given the decentralised spatial equilibrium
conditions and the government budget, that is assumed to be exogenous.
In the solution of the model, optimal infrastructure in a region depends positively on two factors:
size and centrality. The size of a region refers to the magnitude of total trade flows sent and received
by the region. The centrality of a region captures the magnitude of the flow of trade that transits
the region. On the one hand, a large region, will trade intensively with the rest of regions making
infrastructure investments in this region highly beneficial. On the other hand, a central region,
located in the path connecting large regions, will receive a large transit of goods. Investing in this
region will reduce the transport costs of large trade flows, making the marginal benefit of investment
high in this region.These predictions suggest that when the volume of trade or transit in a region
changes permanently, as happened after the division of Germany, the government would like to
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reallocate infrastructure investments.
I calibrate the model to Germany before the Division in two steps, exploiting different historical
data sources. First, I calibrate the parameters relevant for the spatial equilibrium, keeping the
infrastructure network fixed. Specifically, I take the model to data on Germany’s population and
road network in 1938, eleven years before the German division. I employ the 1938 population
distribution to calibrate the district-specific productivity parameters and the road network to calculate
the initial shipping costs. I then assess the fit of the model by comparing the model’s trade predictions
with domestic good shipments in 1938. Second, given the parameters calibrated in the first step,
I estimate the key structural parameter of the model: the returns to highway investments. This
parameter determines whether highway investments have decreasing returns and, therefore, shapes
the concentration of highway investments in each district. Using the Simulated Method of Moments
I estimate this parameter to minimise the difference in the concentration of highway investments
between the model with endogenous infrastructure and the prewar highway Plan.
Given this quantification, I show that the model has good predictive power to explain highway
investments both before the division and after the division. First, I test the fit of the model with the
cross-section of highway investments allocated in the prewar highway Plan. To do so, I solve for the
efficient infrastructure network before the division. Comparing the efficient infrastructure allocation
with the prewar Plan, I find that the model explains the main patterns of investment across districts,
as well as the timing of construction before division. Second, I test the ability of the model to predict
new highway investments after division. To do this, I simulate the division in the model by assuming
that trade costs between East Germany and West Germany become prohibitive. I re-compute the
optimal infrastructure allocation for West Germany taking as given the investments made until 1949.
The model has good predictive power post-division: the change in transport costs implied by the
model’s highway network accounts for 97% of the variation in transport costs between 1950 and
1974 computed using the 1974 highway network in the data. In terms of predictive power, the model
outperforms the prewar highway Plan.
I use the model to quantify the importance of flexibility in the choice of transport infrastructure.
As mentioned before, highways post-division deviated from the prewar highway Plan: 50% of the
kilometres built after division did not follow the Plan. Using the model as a measuring tool, I find
that these government-led deviations increased real income by 0.69%, compared to the outcomes
under the counterfactual construction of the prewar highway Plan. This real income benefit increases
up to 1.86% in an extendel model that allows for international trade since 1960. These gains come
entirely from reshaping the new highway investments while keeping the same budget as the prewar
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Plan. This result confirms that the West German government increased aggregate welfare by
deviating from the prewar Plan in response to the Division.
Finally, I quantify the cost of the rigidity created by the pre-division highways. These initial
two thousand kilometres of highways had to be taken as given by the West German government
after division. To understand whether these initial investments created path-dependence on future
construction, I use the calibrated model. I solve for the unconstrained infrastructure allocation in
West Germany, assuming that no highway had been built before division, and compare it with the
constrained one, taking pre-division highways as given. Aggregate welfare and real income are
1.86% and 1.85% higher under the unconstrained network. In terms of magnitude, these numbers
represent around 10% of the total gains generated by the complete highway network (16.8% increase
in Welfare). This counterfactual shows that the initial highway allocation generated path-dependence
on future investments and constrained aggregate welfare and income gains. The findings of this
paper reveal that allowing for some flexibility when planning infrastructure networks would be
welfare-enhancing, maximizing the gains from infrastructure construction.
Relation with the Literature Transport infrastructure projects represent a substantial fraction of
the budget of governments and international institutions.4 The increasing availability of spatially
disaggregated data has rekindled the interest of policy-makers and academics on how to better
allocate resources to infrastructure upgrading. It is not surprising that a very recent strand of the
literature has focused on studying the endogenous choice of transport infrastructure. There have
been two approaches so far: (1) to model endogenous infrastructure arising from decentralised
decisions like Allen and Arkolakis (2017) and (2) to model endogenous infrastructure as arising from
the decision of a government or planner such as Felbermayr and Tarasov (2015), Fajgelbaum and
Schaal (2017) and Gallen and Winston (2018).5 While Gallen and Winston (2018) investigate the
choice of infrastructure in a general equilibrium model where infrastructure is a capital investment
good that benefits all firms, in my framework the government chooses infrastructure investments in
a spatial set-up and is, therefore, closest to Felbermayr and Tarasov (2015) and Fajgelbaum and
Schaal (2017).
My paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, with a new quantitative model that
extends the state-of-the-art spatial framework (for example Redding (2016)) by explicitly modelling
4Between 1995 and 2005, upgrades to the transportation network constituted around 12% of total World Bank
lending (Asturias et al., 2014)
5Allen and Arkolakis (2017) allow for the emergence of endogenous trade costs due to decentralised shipping
choices of traders along the network
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infrastructure choice. Second, this is the first paper to test the ability of a quantitative spatial
model to explain changes in the infrastructure network exploiting an exogenous shock to economic
fundamentals. The use of a shock such as the division of Germany allows me to test the model’s
predictions exploiting time-variation and, thus, controlling for time-invariant location-specific
factors while the previous models in the literature have been tested using cross-sectional data.
The results of this paper contribute to the literature on the role of history in shaping economic
activity, for example Davis and Weinstein (2002) on the effects of the Second World War bombings
in Japan for city size, Redding and Sturm (2008) on the effects of the division of Germany for
city growth and, most recently, Ahlfeldt et al. (2018) on the effects of the division of Berlin for
agglomeration externalities.6 By estimating the endogenous response of the infrastructure network
to the division of Germany, I show that infrastructure reshaping is an important mechanism that
can exacerbate or atenuate the effects of shocks into the future. Finally, the development and
quantification of the model allows me to compute the cost of path-dependence in levels, while
previous studies had focused on the relative effects of path-dependence across regions (Bleakley
and Lin (2012)). To the best of my knowledge, this paper provides the first estimate in the literature
of the aggregate cost of path-dependence.
Finally, this paper contributes to the extensive literature about the economic effects of infrastruc-
ture investments. This literature can broadly be divided in two categories: First, papers studying
the effect of infrastructure access on local outcomes (for example Donaldson (2018) on prices,
Michaels (2008) and Duranton et al. (2014) on specialisation, Banerjee et al. (2012) and Faber
(2014) on output).7 These papers rely on exogenous variation in the construction of infrastructure
for identification of local effects. Second, papers studying the aggregate effects of infrastructure
investments (for example Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), Allen and Arkolakis (2017) and Nagy
(2016) for the US, Alder and Kondo (2018) for China, Asturias et al. (2014), Donaldson (2018) and
Alder (2014) for India, Tsivanidis (2018) for Colombia and Morten and Oliveira (2018) for Brazil).8
These studies develop rich general equilibrium models to quantify the aggregate effects of transport
infrastructure projects. This paper belongs to this second category and is the first paper to quantify
6Other related studies include Brulhart et al. (2012) on the effects of the Fall of the Iron Curtain for the adjustment of
wages and employment in Austria and Redding and Sturm (2016) on the effects of the London Blitz for local economic
outcomes at the neighbourhood level.
7Other examples are Baum-Snow et al. (2015) on output, Ghani et al. (2016) and Atack et al. (2008) on firm size,
Möller and Zierer (2018) on employment, Duranton and Turner (2012), Baum-Snow (2007), Garcia-Lopez et al. (2015),
Baum-Snow et al. (2017) on population growth.
8Other relevant studies are Balboni (2017) on the interaction between climate change and infrastructure for Vietnam,
Fretz et al. (2017) on the effects of highway on spatial sorting for Switzerland and Heblich et al. (2018) on the impact
of the railway system for commuting patterns and urbanisation in London.
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the gains from reshaping a fraction of the infrastructure network after a large shock. In addition, my
calibration takes into account the endogeneity of infrastructure investments while all the previous
work measures economic gains from infrastructure by taking infrastructure as given or exogenous.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the historical background that serves as a
set-up to the paper and the historical data sources. Section 3 develops a new theoretical framework
with endogenous infrastructure choice and section 4 explains the calibration of the model to the
Pre-division economy. Section 5 tests the ability of the model to explain the 1934 highway Plan and
the new highway construction after the division shock. Finally, section 6 quantifies the importance
of flexibility in the choice of transport infrastructure and section 7 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The division of Germany in 1949
In the aftermath of the Second World War the territory of Germany became divided into four parts.
The two central ones (enclosing nowadays Germany) would be occupied by foreign powers. The
other two parts, the most eastern territories, were annexed to Poland and Soviet Union. Figure 2
shows the territory that constituted the new German state under the occupation of the United States,
Great Britain, France and Soviet Union.
Four zones of occupation were agreed upon by 1945, with each zone under the control of
one foreign power to supervise the German de-militarisation. The eastern part remained under
Soviet Union control while the western part remained under the control of the Western allies. The
delimitation of the East and Western zones followed some pre-existing pattern mostly characterised
by features of natural geography (Wolf, 2009). Following the deterioration of the political relations
between the Western allies and Soviet Union, with the onset of the Cold War, the two zones of
occupation crystallised into two independent countries, West Germany and East Germany, in 1949.
Figure 2 plots the different territories that were constituted after the Second World War: West
Germany, East Germany and two eastmost territories that were integrated into Poland and the Soviet
Union.
West Germany was the largest territory with 53% of the former German territory and 58% of
the population (40 million in 1939).9 East Germany contained around 23% of the area and 22 % of
9All numerical figures in this section are taken from Redding and Sturm (2008), and come from the 1952 edition of
the Bundesrepublik statistical yearbook.
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the population. The former German capital, Berlin, was located within East Germany and was also
divided into West and East Berlin. It was the largest city in Germany, with 4 million inhabitants in
1939.
Figure 2: Germany before and after World War II
Notes:Former German border in 1931 is plotted in black, West Germany is plotted in dark grey while East
Germany is plotted in light grey. The white areas were integrated into Poland and the Soviet Union after
World War II.
In the initial years after the division, in 1949, some economic and political ties between the two
states persisted. Yet, the border became sealed from the Eastern side in 1952 to prevent migrations
to West Germany and all trade relations halted soon after. With the construction of the Berlin Wall
in 1961, all population mobility between East and West Germany stopped as well. The division
of Germany was recognised by the international community and was generally believed to be
permanent.10
The division of Germany separated two territories that had been integrated for centuries, The
foundation of the German Empire in 1871 was the culmination of decades of varying levels of
economic and political integration. According to Wolf (2009), the economic integration within
Germany improved substantially after the First World War and the German territories were an
10The two German states became UN members in 1972, the perceptions of the West German population was that
reunification was very unlikely even in 1980 (Gerhard Herdegen, 1992)
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economically well-integrated area by 1933. The division, therefore, constituted an important shock
that stopped all movement of people and goods between the two states and changed the geographic
configuration of West Germany.
Regarding the transportation network, the former German Empire was well connected by a
railway system completed by the 1910s. This was the main mode of transportation in the XIXth
century. After the First World War, the construction of a highway network was discussed in the
German parliament but was finally rejected.11 The ascent to power of Hitler marked the beginning
of the construction of a German-wide highway network that became one of the star policies of the
Nazi party. This massive infrastructure project was intended as a way to decrease unemployment
and to gain attention from the International press. Fritz Todt, appointed by Hitler as the Inspector
General of German Road Construction, traced a plan for the Highway network in 1934 heavily
inspired by the previous plans designed in the 1920s.12
Transit grew fast along the new highways. In 1955 short-distance shipments by truck were
already three times larger than shipments by railway while long-distance truck shipments amounted
to one-third of railway shipments (Figure A.1 in the Appendix).13 By 1970, highways were already
very popular, with short-distance shipments by truck being five times larger than short-distance
shipments by rail and long-distance truck shipments approaching the magnitude of long-distance
shipments by rail, and overtaking rail shipments by 1985.
2.2 Historical data sources
In order to analyse how the division of Germany affected infrastructure investments I need three
different sets of data. First, information related to the evolution of the highway network including
the outline of the prewar highway Plan. Second, information about economic outcomes that will
serve to calibrate the model and test its predictions. Finally, additional data to use as controls in the
empirical application related to the geography of Germany. The unit of observation throughout the
analysis will be the district (Kreise).14 This subsection provides an overall description of the data
sources employed, further details can be found in section E of the Appendix.
11In the 1920s German politicians discussed the construction of a modern highway system. They formed the
HAFRABA association that lobbied for the construction of a restricted access motorway connecting Hamburg-Frankfurt-
Basel and other connections between major cities (Zeller and Dunlap, 2010).
12Zeller and Dunlap (2010)
13The data source is the Statistical Yearbook of the Bundesrepublik, multiple years. Figure A.1 in the Appendix
shows goods traffic in tons by mode of transport.
14There are 412 districts between East Germany and West Germany of which 313 districts are in West Germany. For
the empirical results the 313 districts are merged according to Mikrocensus regions to account for metropolitan areas.
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The first contribution of this paper will be to document the evolution of the West German
highway network and the deviations of the network from the prewar highway Plan. To do this, I
digitise and geo-reference the outline of the prewar highway Plan from historical documents and
compute the planned highway kilometres in each district. In addition, I collect and geo-reference
highway construction data for East Germany and West Germany for the years 1938, 1950, 1965,
1974, 1980 and 1989 from historical maps and road atlases; and from 1950 and 1965 for federal
roads. This allows me to document the length and pattern of the network by decade and by district.
Figure A.2 and figure A.3 in the Appendix show the evolution of the network between these years
and the pace of construction of the highway network by decade, in kilometres. Finally, I use the
EuroGlobal maps dataset, available online, as a source for geo-referenced data of local roads in
order to complete the German road network.
To calibrate the theoretical model and test its validity I also require information on historical
economic outcomes. I use population data available by decade since 1938 at the district level
(Kreise) from the historical census. In addition to population data, I collect and digitise new data
of traffic of goods by road before and after division. For the pre-division period, I collect traffic
of goods by road for eighteen aggregated traffic districts in Germany in the year 1939. The traffic
data is collected in tons and reported in an aggregated way, as total shipments and total reception of
goods by traffic district. For the post-division period, I digitise data on bilateral shipments of goods
by road across West-German states, for the years 1966 and 1989.15
Finally, I collect supplementary geographical data such as area in squared kilometres by district
and distance to different geographical boundaries such as the East German border and the border
with Western Europe.
2.3 Reshaping of the highway network after division
In the remaining of this section, I will document the construction of the German network of
highways between 1931 and 1975. I stop my analysis on 1975 because by this time, the highway
network in West Germany has the same length as the pre-war highway Plan. In addition, it prevents
the analysis to pick up any of the east-oriented policies that took place during the 1980s.
Figure 3 shows the prewar highway Plan (in light grey) over the territories of West Germany and
East Germany. As we can see, many of the planned highways were cut by the new border or passed
very close to it. This pre-division Plan represents the design of the German government to connect
15The choice of year is due to data availability constraints
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the German territory before the division. This prewar Plan will be useful as a counterfactual for the
network that would have been built given the economic fundamentals of the 1930s.
Figure 3: Prewar highway Plan and highway construction before division
Notes: The figure plots the territories of West Germany and East Germany, delineated in black. The outline
of the prewar highway Plan is plotted in light grey. The highway links that had been built by the year 1946
are plotted in black.
Construction was fast: half of the 6000 planned kilometres were built between 1934 and
the beginning of World War II. Figure 3 depicts in dark grey the highways that had been built
by the year 1946 over the outline of the prewar highway Plan. As it is clear in the figure, the
construction of highways up until the division followed the pattern of the Plan with almost no
deviation. Construction resumed after World War II and an additional 3000 kilometres had been
completed by 1974. To document whether this additional 3000 kilometres were built following the
prewar highway Plan, I classify the old and newly constructed highways into investments that were
planned and investments that were reshaped (allocated to a different district). This classification is
presented in table 1. Until 1950, highway construction followed the prewar Plan (95% of kilometres
built follow the Plan). However, I find considerable reshaping after the division: only 47.2% of the
kilometres built between 1950 and 1974 followed the Plan while 52.8 % of the kilometres deviate
from the prewar planned allocation.
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Table 1: Highway investment allocation ( in %)
Included in the 1934 Highway Plan
Network Yes No Total
Highway km 1950 (2128 km) 95 5 100
Highway km 1950 to 1974 (3015 km) 47.2 52.8 100
Notes: Share of highway investments (in kilometres) allocated according to the 1934 Highway Plan. Column 1 rep-
resents the share of kilometres that were included in the 1934 Highway plan while column 2 represents the share of
kilometres that were not included in the 1934 Plan, and were reshaped. The first row refers to the share of kilometres
built until 1950 while the second row refers to the new kilometres added between 1950 and 1970.
This decomposition shows that the highway network in 1974 was deeply reshaped compared to the
original prewar highway Plan. In the next section, I build a multi-region spatial trade model with
endogenous infrastructure investments to analyse the sources of these deviations, and to quantify
to what extent they can be explained by the change in economic fundamentals that followed the
division of Germany.
3 A theoretical model of endogenous infrastructure choice
In this section, I outline a spatial trade model with endogenous transport infrastructure.16 I first
explore the spatial equilibrium of the model given an initial infrastructure network. Next, I introduce
a government that chooses how to upgrade the infrastructure network to maximize aggregate welfare.
The solution of the model characterises the efficient infrastructure investment pattern, defined as the
upgrade in the infrastructure network that maximises aggregate welfare. Finally, I use the model to
derive qualitative predictions about the response of infrastructure to a shock such as the division of
Germany in 1949. The framework features different locations connected by the transport network.
In each location there will be a number of local firms that produce an endogenous measure of
differentiated varieties like in Krugman (1980). These varieties can be traded across space subject
to transport costs. Workers move across locations to maximize their expected utility that depends
on real income and heterogeneous preferences for locations. The model builds on the family of
quantitative spatial models reviewed by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and is specially close
to Redding (2016). I make two contributions with respect to this framework. First, I introduce
a new transport cost function that includes infrastructure quality. Second, I model a benevolent
16A detailed exposition of the theoretical framework is contained in section C of the Appendix.
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government that chooses infrastructure quality to maximise aggregate welfare.
3.1 Model Set-up
Workers The model features costly trade across many districts, i = 1...N, endowed with exoge-
nous labour productivity, Ai. There is a measure L of workers in the economy. Workers derive
utility from the consumption of differentiated varieties of the tradable good, from the consumption
of housing and from the district they choose to live in. Workers spend a fraction α of their income
on the available differentiated varieties and have CES preferences across varieties, with elasticity of
substitution σ > 1. The remaining income share (1-α) is spent on housing. Finally, workers have
heterogenous preferences across different districts, modelled as an idiosyncratic taste component
bi. Worker ω draws a vector of N realisations {b(ω)i}i=1...N from a Fréchet distribution with shape
parameter , that governs the dispersion of preferences across workers for different districts.17
Firms Production of the differentiated varieties takes place under monopolistic competition,
following Krugman (1980). Firms pay a fixed cost of production in addition to variable production
costs in terms of labour, so that each firm produces a single differentiated variety in equilibrium.
Firms maximise profits by charging a constant mark-up over the marginal cost of production equal
to 1
σ−1 . Production uses labour as only input and labour productivity is determined by the district-
specific productivity level Ai. The free entry condition drives profits down to zero and pins down
the scale of production of each firm. The labour market clearing condition can be solved for the
total number of varieties produced in a district and will be a function of the size of the district in
terms of population.
Housing Residential land is assumed to be in fixed supply, as a function of land endowments. I
denote the endowment of residential land in district i by Hi, that can be used for housing. Each
agent spends (1− α) share of her income on renting residential land and expenditure on land in each
location is redistributed lump-sum to the workers residing in that location as in Redding (2016).
This implies that total income in district i, denoted by viLi, will equal total labour income plus
expenditure on residential land: viLi = wiLi + (1 − α)viLi = wiLi/α. This assumption minimises the
effects of introducing a housing market in the model while still allowing for a dispersion force that
17The parameter  governs the dispersion of heterogenous preferences across workers. A large  implies a low
dispersion of the distribution (low standard deviation). Thus, the idiosyncratic preferences are more similar across
districts for all workers. Workers have resembling tastes so they react more strongly to changes in real incomes. On the
contrary, when  is small the dispersion in preferences is large, and workers are very heterogenous in their taste.
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Figure 4: Example of simple geography
Notes: Geography with 9 regions; dots are the population centres. In grey the initial transport network, with
the same initial quality.
motivates workers to spread across locations because they “dislike” paying high rents.18 The land
market clearing condition will pin down the equilibrium land rent, ri, in each location.
Geography The geography of the framework is as follows. Districts have some geographic
surface of similar size. Workers are concentrated in the centre of the district where consumption
and production happen. The set of districts, i = 1...N, are located on a finite plane of generic shape.
Each district is connected to the adjacent locations by the infrastructure network.19 These network
links can be transited freely by workers but moving goods is costly. The cost of transit depends
on the distance that has to be covered and the quality of the infrastructure along that geographic
distance. Figure 4 provides an illustrative example. This geography can be represented by a graph
of edges (infrastructure links) and vertices (population settlements). The set of settlements in this
network is fixed, so there is no city creation or destruction, and the set of links is also taken as
given.20 The quality of the links, on the contrary, can be improved by investing in infrastructure.
18The real income in location i will be w/(Pαr1−α)
19In the calibration of the model the connexion to adjacent districts will be given by the assumed underlying network
that is constructed from the existing local roads and federal roads (Bundesstrasse)
20The assumption of a fixed network of links that can be upgraded in terms of quality is also present in related papers
in the literature. This constitutes an important difference with the literature about banking, social and business networks
where the links are endogenous. Allen and Arkolakis (2014), on the contrary, consider the continuum of space as
the domain for the transport cost function that is defined at every point of the plane (instantaneous trade costs). The
existence of transport network changes the cost of transit over specific points of the plane.
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3.2 Transport Costs
Consuming non-locally produced varieties is costly because of the dispersion of production and
population across the grid of districts.21 The price of variety i consumed in district n is given by the
production price, pi, and the transport cost of shipping between district i and district n:22
pi,n = piTi,n. (1)
I will now define how the matrix of transport costs {Ti,n}i,n=1...N is determined.
Cost of transit The cost of shipping a good along district i will depend on geography, D, which
determines the distance that has to be covered across the district, and the quality of infrastructure,
Φ, that will determine how costly (slowly) can this distance be transited. The ad-valorem cost of
shipping across district k is defined as the cost of transit:
Cost of transitk =
Dk
φ
γ
k
. (2)
where I use φk to denote the district-level infrastructure in k and Φ to denote the vector of infrastruc-
ture allocations. I assume that the quality of infrastructure is homogeneous within a district.23 This
specification of transit costs means that Dk/φ
γ
k units of the good shipped will be paid in order to
ship one unit of any good across district k. As we can see, a higher infrastructure investment will
reduce the ad-valorem cost of transiting a district. In the quantitative exercise φk will be the quality
of the road and its empirical counterpart will be highway construction.
I assume that φk ≥1, so that the transport cost will always be bounded by the physical geography,
meaning that the ad-valorem transport cost cannot be smaller than 1. Parameter γ is the returns to
infrastructure investments. It measures the elasticity of the ad-valorem transit cost to infrastructure
investments. I assume it to be positive, so that the cost of transit is decreasing on infrastructure
investments. It determines whether infrastructure has increasing returns (γ>1) or decreasing returns
(γ<1).
21I assume a domestic closed economy. Thus, there are no tariffs or other trade costs in addition to transport costs.
22Without loss of generality, I denote the origin of a trade flow with subscript i and the destination of a trade flow
with subscript n.
23In the real world a district may have one very high-quality highway and one very low-quality road. Therefore, we
may think of φi as the average quality of the infrastructure stock in district i.
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Least-cost path problem Given the cost of transit along all districts, what is the cost of shipping
a good from district i to district n? In this network economy there will be many alternative paths
to ship a good between districts i and n. I assume goods are shipped following the least-cost path.
Thus, the transport cost matrix will be the collection of bilateral transport costs along the least-cost
path between each district pair.24 To represent the cost-minimising combination of N-by-N paths
that connect all districts, I define a least-cost path matrix for each district. Each of these matrices is
N-by-N and indicates whether a district k is included in the path that links any other district-pair
along the cost-minimising route. It is related to the transition matrix in the network literature as it
indicates how to transition from one node of the network to any other. For district k, the element
Iki,n∈ Ik indicates whether district k will be on the path when shipping goods from district i to
district n and is defined as:
Iki,n =
1, if k is a transit district in the path between i and n0, if k is not a transit district in the path between i and n. (3)
We can now define the transport cost between any two districts i and n, Ti,n, as
Ti,n =
∑
k
Iki,n
Dk
φ
γ
k
 , (4)
where φk is the infrastructure level in district k, Dk is the length of district k and Iki,n is the (i, n)
element of the least-cost path matrix of district k. The transport cost between i and n is simply the
sum of the geographical distance, scaled by the infrastructure quality of all the districts that are
transited along the least-cost path.25
Figure 5 illustrates the transport cost function with a simple example. Consider the three German
districts in the figure (A, B and C) located sequentially. The transport cost between A and B will
be TA,B = DAφγA
+ DB
φ
γ
B
because these two regions are contiguous. Yet, the transport cost between A
and C will be TA,C = DAφγA
+ DB
φ
γ
B
+ DC
φ
γ
C
. The distance and infrastructure level in district B will affect
the transport cost between A and C. In standard trade models, this middle term will always be zero
because direct shipping is assumed. This assumption implies that the cost of shipping between any
origin and any destination only depends on origin and destination-specific parameters. However, to
24This is similar to modelling a shadow transport sector that operates under perfect competition, and therefore, ships
goods at the minimum costs.
25Given that we have defined {Iki,n } as the least-cost path matrix this implies that we can also express the transport
friction between n and i as Ti,n = minm(T (pmi,n)) where T (p
k
i,n) is the transport cost of shipping a good from i to n along
path m and M would be the set of possible paths.
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study road transportation we need a more general specification of the transport cost function that
takes into account the spatial nature of transport costs.
Figure 5: Transport costs: Illustration
Notice that the least-cost path indicator {Iki,n} will always be one when k = i and k = n. But
when k , {i, n} there will be differences in the value of this indicator for different districts. Districts
located in the centre of the geography will be along the path of most trade flows. Districts located in
the margins of the geography will almost never be transited by trade flows between other districts.
Finally, I adopt a normalisation common to all trade models by assuming Ti,i = 1, equivalent
to assuming free intra-district trade and normalising the cost of trading out of the district by the
internal shipping cost.
3.3 Location choice and Spatial equilibrium
Worker location choice and Welfare Workers choose where to live by maximising indirect
utility, given by real income and the idiosyncratic preference taste. The distribution of indirect
utility is also Fréchet and, given the properties of this probability distribution, we can write the
share of workers that choose to live in district i as:
Li
L
=
(vi/Pαi r
1−α
i )
∑N
n=1(vn/Pαnr1−αn )
, (5)
where vi = wi/α denotes total income in location i. Expected utility for a worker across locations is
given by:26
U˜ = δ
 N∑
i=1
(vI/Pαi r
1−α
i )

1/ , (6)
26See part C of the appendix for derivation details
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where δ = Γ
(

−1
)
and Γ(.) is the gamma function. We impose  > 1 to ensure a finite value of
the expected utility. Because indirect utility follows a Fréchet distribution, the expected utility
conditional on living in district i is the same across all districts and equal to the expected utility of
the economy as a whole.27 Following Redding (2016), I use this measure of expected utility as a
proxy for aggregate welfare.
Spatial equilibrium For a given initial transport network defined by the transport network,
{D,Φ, { Iki,n}∀i,n,k}, and exogenous land endowments {Hi}∀i∈N and productivities {Ai}∀i∈N , the spatial
equilibrium is a combination of wages, price indices, rents and labour allocations, {wi, Pi, ri, Li}
such that the goods and housing markets clear in each district, the domestic labour market clears
domestically and expected utility is equalised across all workers. The equilibrium trade shares and
rental rates can be solved as a function of these four equilibrium variables. The following equations
define the equilibrium vector {wi, Pi, ri, Li}:
The goods market clearing is given by the balanced trade condition:
wiLi =
∑
j
Li
σF
(
σ
σ − 1
wi
Ai
Ti, j
)1−σ
(P j)σ−1w jL j,∀i. (7)
The Price index in district i given by:
P1−σi =
∑
j
L j
σF
(
σ
σ − 1
w j
A j
T j,i
)1−σ
,∀i. (8)
The rental rate is given by the clearing of the housing markets:
ri =
(
1 − α
α
)
wi
Li
,∀i. (9)
The fraction of workers that chooses to live in district i is determined by the worker’s utility
maximisation problem and implies the following workers’ residential choice equation:
Li
L
=
(vi/Pαi r
1−α
i )
∑N
n=1(vn/Pαnr1−αn )
. (10)
Equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) can be solved for the equilibrium vector {wi, Pi, ri, Li}. Lastly,
the equilibrium level of expected utility, U˜, is implicitly determined by the domestic labour market
clearing,
∑
i Li = L.
27Because more productive districts attract more workers despite their preference taste the expected value of indirect
utility, E(bnwn/Pαnr
1−α
n ) will equalise across locations.
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Existence and Uniqueness As shown in Redding (2016) the condition for the existence and
uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium will hold if the elasticity of expected utility to the labour share
in a district is negative, this is, if the dispersion forces are stronger than the agglomeration forces of
the model.28 In the family of models with imperfect labour mobility and housing, the condition for
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is
σ
1 − α
1 + 1

 > 1. (11)
3.4 Problem of the Government: Choice of Infrastructure Investment
I model the choice of infrastructure as a Stackelberg game between the Government and the
economic agents in the economy (workers and firms). The Government is the leader and thus has
the advantage to choose first in the game. The game is solved by backward induction. Thus, the
Government chooses infrastructure to maximise expected utility, U˜, constrained by the choices of
workers and firms, given by the decentralised equilibrium allocation. This set-up is similar to a
Ramsey problem with a Government that maximises welfare replacing the FOCs from the problems
of consumers, firms and workers into the constraints.
I assume that the Government can choose how to allocate a fixed amount of resources to improve
infrastructure across all the districts in the economy. This budget, that I denote by Z, is modelled as
an endowment of the government and thus, is assumed to be exogenous. The cost of investing in
district i is ciφi and the budget constraint of the government is:∑
i
ciΦi ≤ Z. (12)
The marginal cost of construction is equal to ci, that is allowed to differ across districts.
Government’s problem We can write the problem of the Government as follows:
Max
{Φ j}
δ
 N∑
i=1
(vi(Φ)/Pi(Φ)αri(Φ)1−α)
1/ ,
subject to:
28The proof follows the same structure as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
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1. Goods market clearing
wiLi =
∑
j
Li
σF
(
σ
σ − 1
wi
Ai
Ti, j
)1−σ
Pσ−1j w jL j,∀i. (14)
2. Labour market clearing
Li
L
=
(wi/Pαi r
1−α
k )
∑N
k=1(wk/P
α
k r
1−α
k )

and
∑
i
Li = L¯. (15)
3. Minimum trade costs
Ti,k =
∑
n
Ini,k
Dn
Φ
γ
n
 . (16)
4. Government’s budget constraint ∑
i
ciΦiDi ≤ Z, (17)
where Pi =
[∑
j
L j
σF
(
σ
σ−1
1
A j
T j,i
)1−σ]1/(1−σ)
, ri =
(
1−α
α
)
wi
Li
and δ = Γ( 
−1), where Γ is the gamma
function.
Intuition for Welfare effects To build some intuition about the effects of infrastructure investment
on welfare, let us consider the same problem but without allowing the matrices of least-cost paths to
change and in a model with no housing (α = 1). This assumption avoids a response of the shipping
decision to a change in infrastructure upgrading and abstracts from the response of rents to new
investments.29 Holding the shipping path between every pair of districts constant, the first order
condition with respect to φ j is:30
∂L
∂φ j
= 0 : δ1/(1−)
∑
i
∑
k
(
U
vi
)1−
Xk,i
Pi
γI jk,i
D j
φ
γ+1
j
pk︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
Direct effect
+ (σ − 1)
∑
i
∑
k
ηiXki
(
∂Tki
∂φ j
1
Tki
− ∂(Pk)
∂φ j
1
Pk
)
︸                                                 ︷︷                                                 ︸
Response of wages
+ 
∑
i
λi
Li
L
∂Pi∂φ j −
∑
k
∂Pk
∂φ j
1
Pk
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Response of Labour
= µc︸︷︷︸
Marginal cost
,
(18)
29Allowing for changes in the shipping path would just add an additional term to the expression below, accounting for
how the shipping path matrix will change after an infrastructure upgrading. This effect is not quantitatively very large.
30The derivations use Roy’s inequality to get the direct effect and can be found in the part C of the Appendix.
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where vi denotes now real income in district i, vi = wiPαi r1−αk
.
Equation (18) shows that infrastructure investment is chosen so that the marginal benefit
of investing in a district, left-hand side of the equation, equates the marginal cost of building
infrastructure in that district.
The marginal benefit is composed of a direct effect, coming from the response of the Price index,
and of an indirect effect coming from the response of wages and population. As we can see, the
direct effect is just the partial equilibrium effect of an upgrade of infrastructure on aggregate welfare,
before the adjustment of wages and population. This effect is the largest, quantitatively, and affects
real income through the effect of infrastructure investments on the Price index of tradable goods. In
addition, the change in infrastructure quality in district j will trigger an adjustment of wages and
population in response to the new infrastructure quality. In quantitative terms, the response of wages
and population is small compared to the response of the Price index. Intuitively, the response of
wages is increasing on the elasticity of substitution across goods, σ, and the response of population
is increasing on the degree of homogeneity across workers,  (recall that  → ∞ is the case with
perfect worker mobility).31
We can build intuition about the optimal infrastructure allocation by approximating infrastructure
investment in district j with the partial equilibrium term. Rearranging the terms of equation (18)
we can write an expression for the infrastructure investment level in district j:
φ
γ+1
j ≈ D jC

∑
k
(
hk, j + h j,k
)
︸            ︷︷            ︸
Size=Importance as source of trade
+
∑
i, j
∑
k, j
I jk,ihk,i︸          ︷︷          ︸
Centrality=Importance as a hub for trade
 , (19)
where the function hk, j = v1−k
X j,k
Pk
p−σj is increasing in exports from k to j. Equation (19) shows that
infrastructure investments will be higher in districts that trade more, first term in the parenthesis,
and in districts that are transited by large trade flows, second term in the parenthesis.
This expression is a non linear function of the weighted sum of total trade flows that originate
in j, end in j or transit j, with weights being a function of real incomes. To see why, notice that
I jk,i will be one every time i = j or k = j and when j is transited by a trade flow between a pair of
regions not including j. For all other trade flows, the indicator I jk,i will be zero and will not show
31Notice that changes in the transport costs will trigger a larger response of wages if goods are very good substitutes,
thus triggering a large trade response to changes in prices, and if workers are very mobile, thus triggering a large
response of workers to changes in real income.
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up in this expression. Thus, the infrastructure level in district j will be a function of the total trade
flows that originate or end in j and of the trade flows that transit j. Notice this sum includes the
gains for district j, first term, as well as the sum of the gains for all the districts that may benefit
from the infrastructure upgrade in j, similar to the Samuelson rule for the allocation of public goods.
The labels indicate that we can think of this expression as a function of the importance of district j
in terms of size (importance as a source of trade) and in terms of centrality (importance hub for
trade flows).
3.5 The division of Germany in 1949
The theoretical framework developed in this section helps us understand what is the efficient
infrastructure pattern across regions in a general equilibrium framework. As indicated in equation
(19), infrastructure quality will be higher in districts that are an important source of trade flows,
and in districts that are an important hub for trade flows. In this framework, a permanent change in
the size of trade flows or trade transit would create incentives to reshape the infrastructure network.
Given some infrastructure budget, the new investments would be allocated to maximise aggregate
welfare given the new fundamentals and the initial transport network.
The division of Germany into East Germany and West Germany in 1949 was a sharp shock
to the German economic geography (Redding and Sturm, 2008). Firstly, it caused a reduction in
the domestic trade of West German districts as all trade with East Germany stopped. Besides, the
transit of goods changed once the inner border was established, causing previously central districts
to become remote after division. Finally, the division changed the the transportation network since
the border cut through some existing roads.
In the next section, I take the model to historical data of Germany and I provide several tests of
its ability to capture the economic geography of Germany.
4 Calibration and Test of the model
In the previous section, I built a quantitative spatial model that incorporates endogenous infrastruc-
ture investments. In this section, I take the model to the data. The goal is to achieve a quantification
of the model that captures highway choice in Germany, both before and after division, and that can
be used to study the economic gains from infrastructure investments.
In the first part of this section, I explain the calibration strategy and the parametrization of the
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model. In the second part of this section, I test the quantitative performance of the model. I use
newly collected data of shipments by road to show that the model can replicate the pattern of trade
across districts before division as well as the change in trade flows after division.
4.1 Taking the model to Germany before division
The goal of this calibration is to obtain a quantitative model that represents as close as possible the
spatial equilibrium of the German economy before the division. To take the model to the data I need
to calibrate two sets of parameters: first, the pre-division transport network that will determine the
initial transport cost matrix, and, second, the parameters of the model that will determine the spatial
equilibrium.
4.1.1 Initial network and Transport costs
The geography of this model is a graph composed of a set of districts linked by the transport network.
This graph represents the underlying geography of Germany and is assumed to be fixed. On the
contrary, the quality of the links can be upgraded by investing in infrastructure. I build the underlying
graph as follows. I combine the highways, (Autobahns) and all federal highways (Bundesstraße)
that existed in 1938.32 I add the local roads needed to ensure that all districts in Germany are
connected to the network. This gives me a network that contains all german districts.33 Figure A.4
in the Appendix displays the roads chosen for the initial network and the graph corresponding to
this network.34
After building the network, I compute the cost of transporting goods following Combes and
Lafourcade (2005). I compute the shipping cost by adding a time-related component and a distance-
related component. These costs are the frictions that the government will be able to reduce by
investing in infrastructure quality. Finally I convert the computed initial transport costs (in euros) to
ad-valorem transport costs by scaling the cost of shipping by the average value of the shipment of a
truck in Germany in 1950. Full details about the cost computation can be found in part D of the
Appendix.
Given the graph and the associated transit costs I can compute the initial transport cost matrix
by applying a least-cost path algorithm to the network. This calibration yields the transport cost
32The federal highways are roads with multiple lanes but not limited-access like Autobahns
33I provide further details of the construction of the network in D of the Appendix.
34For the network construction I use the Network Analysis toolkit in the geographic information software ArcGIS.
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matrix in 1938.
4.1.2 Parameter choice
In addition to the transport cost matrix {Ti,n}, calculated as explained above, the model described
in section 3 has several additional parameters to be calibrated. First, there are two district-specific
vectors of parameters: {Ai}, the exogenous productivity of each district and {Hi}, the land endowment
of each district. Then there are standard parameters present in other trade and spatial models. This is
the case of α, the share of tradable goods in total expenditure, , the shape parameter of the Fréchet
distribution from which idiosyncratic tastes are drawn and (σ − 1), the trade elasticity. Finally, the
model has three parameters related to the construction of infrastructure: γ, the elasticity of transport
costs to infrastructure investments, Z, the budget of the government for infrastructure upgrades and
{ci} the district-specific marginal cost of construction.
Standard parameters calibrated to exogenous values I calibrate {, α} to existing values in the
literature. I set the shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution to  = 3 following the estimated value
from domestic migration flows across U.S. counties by Monte et al. (2015). I vary this parameter in
robustness checks to  = 7, value estimated for the heterogeneity of worker’s preferences governing
commuting and location choices within Berlin in Ahlfeldt et al. (2018). I calibrate an expenditure
share of tradables of α=0.7, leaving an expenditure share of housing of (1 − α) = 0.3 following
Redding and Sturm (2008) in their study about the population growth effects of the German division.
Notice that this choice of parameters ensures that the condition for the existence of a unique and
stable spatial equilibrium is fulfilled.
Standard parameters calibrated to Germany 1938 The district-level land endowments, {Hi},
are equated to the surface of each district in squared kilometres as measured in the data.
Given the land endowments, the district-level productivities, {Ai}, are calibrated to match the
population distribution of Germany in the year 1938. I compute the productivity level of each
district by inverting the spatial equilibrium and solving for the vector of district productivities that,
in equilibrium, delivers the population distribution observed in the data.35 I use population at the
district-level for 1938 from the German Census collected in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
35This calibration technique is explained in the survey by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017)
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Parameter estimated using the full-structure of the model: Trade elasticity Finally, I use data
on shipments by road over 10 distance brackets in 1938 to calibrate the trade elasticity parameter
(1 − σ). For this estimation I use the full structure of the model with fixed infrastructure. First, I
estimate the elasticity of trade shipments to distance using historical data of shipments and obtain
an estimate of β = −2.8∗∗∗. This estimate is larger than the average magnitude estimated in the
literature but transiting through ground-transport means, such as roads, has been shown to yield
substantially higher distance coefficients(Disdier and Head (2008)).
Under the standard assumptions of the gravity equation this elasticity is the product β = (1−σ)×ν,
where ν = ∂log(Ti, j)/∂log(disti, j). The consensus in the literature is to choose ν = 0.3 (Monte et al.
(2015) among others). The parameter ν does not have an exact counterpart in my model. It will
be a combination of the elasticity of transport costs to distance along different types of road and
conditional on transit over the least-cost path.
To compute the value of σ implied by the estimated elasticity of β = −2.8∗∗∗ we need the
elasticity ν in 1938 as implied by my model. To this end I set the elasticity of substitution to σ=5,
following the consensus in the trade literature (for example (Broda et al., 2008)), and compute the
implied trade flows across all district pairs conditional on the parameter values chosen above. The
elasticity of trade shipments to distance in the model with σ = 5 is βmodel = −1.84∗∗∗, which implies
a value of ν = ∂log(Ti, j)/∂log(disti, j) = 0.46. Given ν = 0.46, I set σ = 7 in order to achieve an
elasticity of trade flows with respect to distance that matches the estimated elasticity in the data of
1938 (βmodel = −2.8). Table B.1 shows that the elasticity of trade shipments to distance in the model
with σ = 7 is βmodel = −2.78∗∗∗, equal to the elasticity estimated in the data.
Parameters related to Infrastructure-choice The three parameters specific to my model that
are crucial for the choice of infrastructure are γ, the returns to infrastructure investments, Z, the
government’s budget to invest on infrastructure and {ci}, the district specific marginal construction
cost. Recall that the budget constraint of the government is:∑
i=1...N
ciφi ≤ Z, (20)
where {φi} is the vector of infrastructure investment allocations. Because the initial underlying grid
is based on the existing highways and roads in Germany these links will already be, to some extent,
equally easy to build on. The model will never predict construction along very rugged terrain or
across bodies of water. Thus, I choose ci = c,∀i to simplify the computation problem. However, the
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ruggedness of the terrain or the existence of rivers could be introduced easily in the problem.
I discipline the two remaining parameters {γ,Z} using the design of the 1934 highway Plan. The
parameter γ, the returns on infrastructure investments, determines whether infrastructure investments
have increasing or decreasing returns. Therefore, this parameter will shape the concentration
of highway investments at the district level. I estimate γ to bring the degree of concentration
of investments in the model as close as the concentration in the 1934 Plan. As a measure of
concentration of investments I use the skewness of the distribution of highway kilometres in the
1934 highway plan. I estimate this parameter using Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) on a
simulated 50-district economy where I discipline the productivity distribution using random draws
from a distribution similar to the calibrated productivities in the previous section. This estimation
yields parameter γ = 0.84. Further details are provided in section D of the Appendix.
The budget of the government, Z ,does not have a data counterpart in terms of units, but a
measure of how much ad-valorem costs could potentially be reduced. To calibrate the budget
meeasure, I use the distribution of highway kilometers by district allocated in the 1934 prewar Plan.
Transport costs in the model are specified in ad valorem units, while investments in the plan are
specified in kilometers. To make these measures comparable, I use the share of the budget/highway
kilometers that a district receives. Plotting the shares in the model and in the data we can assess
how similar are the distributions, specially, the number of districts that receive zero investments. I
choose a measure for the initial budget in 1938, Z, that generates a similar distribution in terms of
investments shares as the prewar plan. Figure A.5 in the appendix plots the investments shares in
the model and in the 1934 Plan.
4.2 Test of the model: Gravity and transport costs
Given the initial transport network summarised by {Ti,n}and the value of the model parameters
chosen above I solve for the spatial equilibrium defined by equations (7), (8),(9) and (10) of section
3. With the equilibrium endogenous variables {wi, Pi, ri, Li} I find the model simulated trade matrix
between all German districts. Notice that this equilibrium takes the infrastructure network as given
by the transport cost matrix {Ti,n}.
Trade flows before Division As a first check I show that the relation between trade flows and
distance is very close in the data and in the model. I collect the total tons of goods shipped by
distance bracket from manufacturing shipments and furniture shipments in the year 1938 within
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Germany.36 I construct the share of shipments in real terms by distance bins in equilibrium using
the calibrated model and compare the model’s predictions with the data. Figure 6 plots the density
of trade flows over distance in the data (continuous line) and in the model (dashed line). The very
good fit of the model to the data is not surprising because I calibrate σ = 7 to match the elasticity of
trade flows to distance but it is reassuring that such a good fit can be achieved by fitting only one
parameter.
To check the model fit, I aggregate total trade by district into a different classification, traffic-
districts (Verkehrsbezirken), for which I observe road shipments in the historical data. The data
provides a measure of the total tons of goods received by road in any traffic-district from the rest
of Germany and of total tons shipped to the rest of Germany. This information is available for 18
traffic-districts (that contain all 412 districts in Germany). I compare the predicted trade in the
model with the total imports and total exports of each traffic-district in the data.
Figure 6: Model fit of trade flows over distance
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Notes: Share of total weight of good shipments by distance bins. The continuous line plots the density of goods shipments over
distance in the goods traffic data while the dashed line plots the density of trade flows over distance in the model. Goods shipments
only contain shipments by truck of manufacturing firms and furniture.
Figure 7 plots the goods traffic data against the model predictions. The correlation between
the model and the data is corr=0.59 for total imports and corr=0.70 for total exports (the model
explains 35% of the cross-sectional variation in imports and 50% of the variation in exports, as
36Data collected from Statistical yearbook of the Deutches Reich (1940)
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measured by the R-squared). Thus, the calibration presented in the previous sub-section does an
excellent job in replicating trade flows across German districts before division. Notice that this is
not a surprising fact, urban models of this kind have been successfully used to explain economic
variables such as population and trade. Nevertheless, these results help me build confidence in the
specific calibration chosen.
These two tests show that the model has the ability to explain the spatial equilibrium of Germany
and captures well the trade flows observed in the cross-sectional data.
Figure 7: Model fit of domestic trade
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Notes: Each dot represents one traffic-district, there are 18 in total. Data comes from the Statistical Yearbook of the Bundesrepublic, year 1940.
The road shipment data is collected in tons and split up by tons imported and tons exported to the rest of German districts.
Change in trade flows after division I now provide an additional test of the ability of the spatial
model with endogenous infrastructure networks to explain economic outcomes. To this end, I
exploit the unexpected appearance of a border between East and West Germany after the Second
World War. The division of Germany happened as a result of the increasing tensions the United
States and the Soviet Union. While the division was supposed to be temporary, it became permanent
once the conflict between these two countries escalated.
The unexpected division of Germany can be used to test whether the structural model can
capture the reaction of the economy to this division shock, that exogenously changed the Market
Access and Centrality of all West German districts37.
37Redding and Sturm (2008) show that an economic geography model like the one I use in this paper can successfully
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I compare the change in domestic trade flows across German states between 1950 and 1974
with the model’s prediction. This is an over-identification test, since the calibration was based only
on pre-division data. To perform this test, I simulate the division of Germany by assuming that trade
costs between East Germany and West Germany became prohibitive. Further details are provided in
the next section.
The goal is to show that the calibration of transport costs generates a reasonable response of
trade flows, comparable to the data. I collect historical on trade flows between west German states
in 1960 and in 1989. Due to data constraints the earliest year I can use at the beginning of the
post-division period is 1960.
The change in trade flows is computed as the growth rate of trade flows across German states
(log-change)38. To assess the performance of the model in capturing changes in domestic trade
flows, I compare the data with a model simulation. I use the model to predict the change in trade
flows between 1960 and 1980, by computing trade flows after the division (1960) and trade flows
just before reunification (year 1989)39
As a measure of change in transport costs during the period I compute the change in ad valorem
transport costs from every district-pair for the network in 1950 and the network in 1980. This
variable, ∆TC, is always negative going from 0 to -2 (zero change up to 200% reduction). I measure
transport cost improvements one decade earlier than the trade flows to allow for firms and consumers
to adjust to the new infrastructure. Then, the changes in transport costs are aggregated to the state
level by taking simple means to compute the state-to-state change in ad-valorem transport costs. I
run the following regression with historical data as well as with the model generated data:
∆lnTrade1960,1989s,s′ = µ1∆TC
1950,1980
s,s′ + vs,s′ , (21)
where s, s’ are two states in West Germany and TC is the ad-valorem average transport cost
computed along the least-cost path given the highway network.
Table 2 reports the relation between log-changes in trade flows and changes in transport costs. As
we can see, the model is able to capture remarkably well the response of trade flows to reductions in
transport costs when we account for the change in highways ( column (1) vs column (2)). According
to these results, a pair of states that benefited from a reduction in the ad-valorem transport cost
capture the population response to the division shock of the 100 largest West German cities. I do a similar exercise
including all districts and I extend the analysis to trade flows
38The data is in tons while the simulated data from the model is in nominal value of flows
39The trade flows for the years 1960 and 1989 are generated by solving the spatial equilibrium of the model setting
the total population to the 1960 (1989) and the highway network to the observed 1960 (1989) highways.
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similar to the mean (-1), saw an increase in trade flows of 19.5% in the data and of 14.5% in the
model.
Table 2: Out-of-sample Test: Change in trade flows 1960 to 1989
Dep. Var: ∆log(Tradei, j) Data Simulation
(1) (2)
Change in Transport costs (1980-1950) -0.195*** -0.145**
(0.0542) (0.0613)
Constant 0.714*** 0.295***
(0.0597) (0.0711)
Obs. 90 90
R-Squared 0.117 0.0435
Mean Change -0.995
St. Dev Change 0.51
Notes: Robust HAC standard errors, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. The Change in Transport costs is computed as the change in ad valorem transport
costs from district to district, for the transport network in 1950 and the network in 1980. This variable
is always negative going from 0 to -2. The changes in transport costs are aggregated by taking simple
means to compute the state-to-state change in transport costs. The Data variable is log-change in tons
shipped across each pair of states. The Model simulations use the log-change in nominal value of
state-to-state trade.
These tests confirm that the static model built in section 3 performs strikingly well in predicting
the trade patterns across districts before the division as well as the long-term changes in trade flows
after division. Thus, the ability of the model to predict these responses of trade flows to geography
and transport costs provides strong confidence in the quantification of the model.
5 Explaining highway choice
In this section, I examine whether the calibrated quantitative framework presented in the last two
sections can explain highway choice. One of the main contributions of the paper will be to show that
a quantitative spatial model can help us study infrastructure investment decisions by governments. I
start by assessing the validity of the model to explain district-level highway investments assigned in
the 1934 prewar highway Plan (cross-sectional variation). The 1934 highway Plan, though formally
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proposed by the Hitler government, was heavily inspired by previous engineering plans proposed
in the 1920s and 1930s. After assessing the model’s performance before division, I test whether it
can also account for changes in highway allocation, exploiting the large-scale shock to economic
fundamentals caused by the division of Germany (time-variation).
5.1 Solving for the efficient highway network
I use the model to compute the optimal infrastructure network given the German geography before
the division. The model developed in section 3 embeds an endogenous choice of infrastructure
in a standard spatial equilibrium framework. To solve for the efficient network upgrading before
division, I recompute the initial trade costs matrix by assuming that no highway link has been built
yet. Thus, the quality of all links is set to local roads. Then, I solve for the infrastructure allocation
that maximises the government’s problem.
To this end, I impose that infrastructure investment in a district will be bounded from below
(φi ≥ 1) to ensure that the government is constrained by the initial underlying geography. This also
ensures that previously built infrastructure, like the network of local roads, cannot be disinvested
or reallocated. Finally, I adjust the budget to account for the cost imposed by this lower bound
restriction.
Given the productivity distribution, the initial transport network and the calibrated and estimated
structural parameters, I compute the infrastructure allocation that maximises aggregate welfare. The
solution to the government’s problem is a 395 vector of the efficient district-level investments that I
will compare to the 1934 government plan.
Solution method Given the parameter values, the underlying transport network and the initial
transport costs, I solve for the infrastructure allocation that maximises expected utility. The solution
will be a vector of 395 infrastructure investments representing the spatial pattern of infrastructure
investments.
The model does not feature congestion costs because transport costs are independent of the
quantity shipped (∂Ti, j
∂Xi j
= 0). This choice simplifies the solution method because given the network
and the investment vector I can compute transport costs independently of the equilibrium allocation.
However, the lack of congestion makes the government’s problem not globally convex.40 The
short-come of modelling transport costs as constant on the quantity shipped (weakly convex) is
40See Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) for a detailed discussion about convexity in spatial networks
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that I cannot prove that the solution I find is the global optimum of the problem. Given how the
government problem has been defined, this seems to be a minor concern. The local optimum will
be the best possible deviation from the initial network. This solution coincides with the problem
the government has to solve: how to allocate limited resources to upgrade the highway network.
The problem, therefore, mimics the structure of the problem solved in the data: how to continue the
allocation of the remaining part of the planned network. On the contrary, the solution of the global
optimum may be very far from the initial network and require a much more significant investment.
Even without congestion the spatial problem of the economy is convex and features a unique and
stable spatial equilibrium (given the calibrated parameter values in the previous section). Since the
transport costs are constant on the quantities traded and convex on the infrastructure investments
the problem is (weakly) convex.
I can rewrite the problem as an optimisation of the expected utility in equilibrium over the
infrastructure investment vector:
Max
{φ j} j∈N
EUeq = f (weq(Φ), Peq(Φ), req(Φ), Leq(Φ),T eq(Φ),Φ), (22)
where EUeq is the equilibrium expected utility for a given infrastructure network and a given vector
of infrastructure investments (Φ). The equilibrium expected utility is a function of the equilibrium
wages, weq(Φ), equilibrium Price indices Peq(Φ), equilibrium rents, req(Φ), equilibrium population
allocation, Leq(Φ) and the equilibrium transport cost matrix, T eq(Φ). To solve for the infrastructure
allocation, I start the problem from the initial transport network (assuming all roads are local), and
I search for the infrastructure allocation that maximises expected utility using an interior-point
algorithm.
5.2 Explaining the prewar highway Plan
The solution of the model is the share of the investment budget that should be allocated to each
district to maximise aggregate Welfare. Having solved for the efficient allocation in the model, I now
compare it with the district-level highway investments in the 1934 Plan. As mentioned before, this
prewar plan was heavily inspired by the 1920 and 1930 designs proposed by a group of engineers
lobbying to build a german-wide highway network.41
41In the 1920s German politicians discussed the construction of a modern highway system. They formed the
HAFRABA association that lobbied for the construction of a restricted access motorway connecting Hamburg-Frankfurt-
Basel and other connections between major cities (Zeller and Dunlap, 2010).
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First, I convert the share of investment into highway kilometres by assuming that the number of
kilometres built in the model is the same as the total kilometres in the 1934 Highway plan. Figure
8 plots the optimal number of kilometres per district in the model solution (upper figure) and the
number of kilometres per district allocated in the 1934 highway plan (lower figure). The shading
represents the units of investment predicted by the model or allocated in the plan in each district.
The model is able to predict the main patterns of investment, such as the connections of the
main German cities to Berlin (West to East and South to East links). The model is also able to
capture the relative importance of the different highway links. In figure A.6 in the Appendix we
can observe the comparison between the model’s prediction and the first highways that were built
before division. The model’s predicted intensity of investment coincides with the timing of the
highway construction: the darkest links in the model, higher investment, were the first ones to be
built showing that the districts with a high marginal benefit of highway investments according to the
model were the districts that received these investments earlier in time.
Finally, and as expected, the model underpredicts investments at the border because the baseline
model abstracts from international trade and other geopolitical concerns that may have been driving
infrastructure investments. I introduce international trade in the solution to the optimal investments
post-division to understand the relevance of trade as a driver of infrastructure construction.
To test the predictive power of the model-generated investments, I run the following regression
at the district level:
Hi,Plan = α + β1Hi,OPT + X′φ + ui,t, (23)
where Hi,Plan is the total number of highway kilometres planned in district i in year 1934 and Hi,OPT
is the number of kilometres allocated to district i in the efficient network of the model. The vector
X′ represents district-level controls, such as the distance to the border with Western Europe and the
area of a district is squared kilometres. The coefficient of interest is β1, that captures the relation
between the model’s prediction and the observed planned highway.
The identification of β1 could be biased if there are district-specific characteristics that affect
population and other fundamentals as well as highway investments before division. For example,
being close to a Port increases the centrality of a region relative to the rest of the world and may have
attracted population and trade as well as better infrastructure for decades. To control for some of the
geography related time-invariant factors such as the ruggedness of terrain or proximity to the coast I
run an additional specification that includes state-level fixed effects. It is clear that these controls
will not dissipate the concern about the existence of omitted variables. Therefore, in the next section
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Figure 8: Simulated Infrastructure investments before the division shock
A) Model
B) 1934 Highway Plan
Notes: The shading represents the number of highway kilometres by district (darker, more kilometres). The
upper panel displays the highway kilometres predicted by the model while the lower panel displays the
highway kilometres allocated to each district in the 1934 Highway Plan.
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I exploit the change in economic fundamentals caused by the division of Germany to address some
of these problems. Table 3 reports the results of this specification and table B.3 in the Appendix
reports the results with standard errors clustered at Government regions (Regierungsbezirke).42
Table 3: 1934 Highway Plan : Cross-sectional variation
OUTCOME: Highway km Plan Highway km Plan Highway km Plan
(1) (2) (3)
Optimal highway km 0.4464*** 0.3199*** 0.3221***
(0.0565) (0.0492) (0.0494)
Log Pop 1938 3.8921** 4.6429**
(1.5242) (2.0525)
Distance to the Border 0.0589*** 0.0581***
(0.0187) (0.0219)
Elevation -0.0035 -0.0162**
(0.0046) (0.0069)
Area (sqkm) 0.0114*** 0.0118***
(0.0022) (0.0025)
Constant 10.2888*** -48.6655*** -43.7996
(1.2235) (18.5381) (29.0911)
State FE No No Yes
Observations 331 323 323
R2 0.266 0.383 0.450
Mean Highway km 20
SD Highway km 24
Notes: Robust HAC standard errors, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%. Results for the 395 German districts aggregated into 331 micro-census regions. The dependent variable
is the number of highway kilometres in the 1934 Plan for each district. Optimal highway km is the highway
kilometres predicted by the quantitative model. Distance to West Border measures the distance from the district
centroid to the German border with a western European country.
My results show that the model-generated network can explain 26.5% of the cross-sectional
variation in planned highways across German districts. The coefficient β1 = 0.44∗∗∗ shows the close
relation between the predicted investments and the observed investments. This coefficient is reduced
after introducing controls to β1 = 0.31∗∗∗. The reduction in the coefficient shows that controlling for
42Clustering the standard errors at the Government region seeks to control for spatial correlation of errors. There are
30 Government regions.
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district specific factors such as population, distance to the border, elevation or area of the terrain
seems to be very important to assess the actual predictive power of the model. However, the model’s
predicted investment is still positive and significant. Finally, the coefficient remains stable after
including state-level fixed effects, column 3. As expected, the coefficients on Area and Distance
to Border are positive showing that the 1934 Highway Plan allocated more kilometres to larger
districts and to districts closer to the interior of the country.
There are a few discrepancies between model and data. These discrepancies are clear when
looking at the spatial distribution of investments in Figure 8. First, the model’s measure of investment
is smooth and thus the investment pattern is more gradual than the highway pattern. Second, the
model fails to capture the investments near the Eastern border of Germany. In 1934, the German
territories extended further East than the current German border and, thus, in figure 8 we observe
several planned highways that crossed the border with Poland, (former) Czechoslovakia and Austria.
Finally, we do see that the plan invests heavily in the centre of the country while the model’s solution
is more radial.
It is also worth noting that comparing the district to district investment levels does not capture
the network structure of highways but takes districts as independent observations. To capture
the spatial nature of the data, I compare the changes in bilateral transport costs that each district
would enjoy after the construction of the model predicted investments and after the hypothetical
completion of the 1934 Highway Plan. I run the following regression,
∆T Plan−1938i, j = β1∆T
OPT−1938
i, j + vi, j, (24)
where ∆T Plan−1938i, j =TC
Plan
i j −TC1938i j , the difference in bilateral transport costs given the road network
of 1938 and the complete construction of the 1934 Highway Plan. ∆TOPT−38i, j =TC
Model
i j − TC1938i j is
the difference in bilateral transport costs given the road network of 1938 and the model-predicted
highway allocation. The results of this regression, Table B.4 in the Appendix, show that the model
explains most of the change in transport costs that would have taken place if the 1934 Highway Plan
had been built (β = 0.6∗∗∗, R2 = 0.716). This means that the district-pairs that would have become
better connected according to the construction of the Plan are the same district-pairs that would
have become better connected under the model-generated network.
In all, these results suggest that a model with endogenous infrastructure investments performs
well in predicting the cross-section of highway investments as designed in the 1934 Plan.
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5.3 Explaining highway construction after the division of Germany
As pointed out in the previous section, the existence of district-specific time-invariant factors such
as geographical advantages or political importance poses a threat to identifying the predictive power
of the model for the cross-section of highway investments. To address this threat, I exploit the
German division. This large-scale exogenous shock allows me to test the ability of the model to
predict changes in highway allocation over time. Focusing on the change in highway kilometres
built between 1974 and 1950 enables me to control for time-invariant characteristics affecting the
stock of highways in that district. I will now explain how I simulate the division shock and solve for
the optimal highway construction, after the division.
Simulation of the division shock Following the division of Germany in 1949, West Germany
suffered an important shock to trade and population mobility after the establishment of the inner
German border. To understand how this exogenous shock to economic fundamentals affected the
highway network, I use the calibrated version of my model explained in the previous subsection.
I simulate the division shock by introducing a border friction, {Bi j}. The border friction
multiplies the transport cost and is parametrised as follows:
Bi, j =
1 if i, j belong to West Germany> 1, in all other cases. (25)
In the numerical implementation I use the extreme assumption that Bi, j = ∞, by eliminating East
German districts from the set of possible trade partners and location destinations.
Constrained choice of infrastructure After the division of Germany, the government’s choice
is restricted to upgrading the part of the network that remained in West Germany. Therefore, the
new government’s problem is to upgrade the infrastructure in West Germany in order to maximise
the aggregate welfare of West German districts. One important constraint for the choice of the
government was the existing highways that had been built between 1934 and 1950 (Figure 3). About
one half of the six thousand kilometres outlined in the 1934 Highway plan had been built before the
division (two thousand kilometres were built in West Germany, while one thousand were built in
East Germany). To capture this physical constraint, I add to the government’s problem in section 3
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the following lower bound constraint:
φPostdivisionj ≥ φPredivisionj . (26)
This constraint will allow us to compare the constrained solution in the model with the constrained
solution in the data. Finally, I assume that all other structural parameters remain unchanged.43
In this assumption, I follow Redding and Sturm (2008) that interpret the division of Germany as
mainly a trade and labour shock. They provide strong evidence showing that other factors such
trends in specialisation, or the fear of further armed conflict were important but to a much lesser
extent compared to the trade shock. The integration of Western European countries after 1960 in
the framework of the European Economic Community is considered in an extension of the model
explained in next section.
Baseline results Figure 9 plots the spatial distribution of highway investments predicted by the
model after the division of Germany. The shades represent the investment allocation predicted by
the model, with darker shades representing higher investments. This efficient (constrained) network
serves as a benchmark of the highway investments we would observe if the government’s choice
was driven by the change in economic fundamentals. The change between the predicted investments
and the highways built by 1949, initial constraints, is the new highway construction.
As documented in section 2, about half of the new construction deviated from the original 1934
highway Plan. I compare the predictions of the model relative to the change in highways between
1950 and 1974 to show that the model can account for the time-variation of highways in the data.
5.4 Explaining new highway construction
An empirical challenge that we face when analysing highway construction in the cross-section is
that highway construction may be driven by district-specific factors affecting other fundamentals.
For example, districts in the mountains have less population and trade less goods because of their
remoteness and, at the same time, receive less highway construction because of the low demand
for transport and the high construction cost. Thus, the elevation of the terrain creates a positive
correlation between economic fundamentals and highway construction. These type of factors would
induce a bias in the estimation of the predictive power of the model.
43Table B.2 in the Appendix summarises the calibrated and estimated values for all parameters.
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Figure 9: Simulated Infrastructure investments after division - Baseline
A) Model (Baseline)
B) Data (1974-1950)
Notes: The shading represents the change in highway kilometres by district (darker, more kilometres). The
upper panel displays the changes predicted by the model while the lower panel displays the highway changes
observed in the data (new highway construction between 1950 and 1974).39
A good solution in the presence of time-invariant characteristics is to perform the estimation
using changes in the variable of interest. To test the strength of the model in predicting the change
in highway construction, I use the change in highway investments. As a measure of highway
change, I will use ∆Hi = Hi,1974 − Hi,1950, the change in highway kilometres in district i between
1974 and 1950. The model counterpart of this empirical measure will be the ∆HOPT = ∆HPost,
the district-level highway kilometres allocated after the division of Germany, from the remaining
budget. This measure is the increase in highway construction on top of the already built highways
that are included as a constraint for the government.
To test the predictive power of the model I run the following regression, at the district level:
∆Hi,74−50 = γ1∆HOPT + νi,t, (27)
where i denotes districts.
The outcome measure, ∆Hi,74−50 is the difference in highway kilometres in district i between
1974 and 1950. The main regressor ∆HOPT is the allocation of the additional highway kilometres in
the model, subtracting the initial investments realised by 1950. Because this is a first-differences
specification I do not include district geographical characteristics or state fixed effects. This
specification tests whether the predicted changes in highway investments in the quantitative model
can explain the changes in highway construction observed in the data. Notice that the model-
generated changes are purely driven by the simulation of the division shock, and therefore, only
account for the economic factors affecting highway construction. The coefficient of interest is
γ1 that identifies the relation between the predicted changes and the observed highway reaction
in the data. The results are reported in Table 4. The results with standard errors clustered at the
Government region level are reported in table B.5 in the Appendix.
The estimated coefficients show that the model is also successful in explaining the changes in
highway construction. We can think of these changes as the innovations implemented after the
division shock. The predicted construction in the model explains 19% of the cross-district variation
in highway changes (column 1) and has strong predictive power even controlling for distance to the
border and the district’s area. I find that an increase of one kilometre in the model after division
predicts an increase of 0.41 kilometres in the data. This coefficient falls slightly when adding
controls such as population in 1950 or distance to the border, but the coefficient stays positive and
significant. In the last column I allow for state-specific time-deviations ( with state fixed effects)
and the relationship between the model predictions and the observed changes remains positive and
very significant.
40
The fact that the coefficient is far from unity, that we would expect if the model and the data were
perfectly aligned, just tells us that the model predicts a stronger reaction to the division shock than
the one observed in the data. This attenuated reaction could be driven by constraints or adjustment
costs in the real world that are absent in the model. Furthermore, this estimated coefficient of 0.41
could be explained by the existence of other factors driving highway investments such as political
interests.
Table 4: Change in highway construction
OUTCOME ∆ Kilometres ∆ Kilometres ∆ Kilometres
(1974 − 1950) (1974 − 1950) (1974 − 1950)
(1) (2) (3)
Optimal change in Kilometres 0.4101*** 0.2307*** 0.2350***
(0.1106) (0.0676) (0.0719)
Log Pop 1950 3.9567** 3.7540*
(1.7505) (2.0213)
Distance to West Border -0.0312*** -0.0326**
(0.0109) (0.0137)
Area (sqkm) 0.0037 0.0043*
(0.0023) (0.0024)
Elevation -0.0038 -0.0078
(0.0036) (0.0064)
Plan 1934 km 0.3923*** 0.3858***
(0.0672) (0.0701)
Constant 7.1523*** -43.1408** -33.8805
(1.2356) (20.4614) (26.9219)
State FE No No Yes
Observations 258 257 257
R2 0.188 0.441 0.447
Notes: Robust HAC standard errors, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. Results for the 258 West German districts. The dependent variable is the change in
highway kilometres between 1950, the end of the division and 1974. Optimal change km is the predicted
increase in highway kilometres simulated in the quantitative model. highways built. Distance to West
Border measures the distance from the district centroid to the German border with a western European
country.
As we did before, I also measure the predictive power of the model looking at changes in the
bilateral transport costs between all pairs of districts. I run a similar regression that correlates the
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change in ad-valorem transport cost between 1950 and 1974 with the model-implied change in
ad-valorem transport cost under the assumption that the construction after 1950 follows the model
solution:
∆T 74−50i, j = β1∆T
OPT−50
i, j + vi, j, (28)
where ∆T 74−50i, j is the change in bilateral transport costs between years 1950 and 1974, between
districts i and j, and ∆TOPT−50i, j is the change in bilateral transport costs between 1950 and the model’s
efficient network.
Table B.6 in the Appendix, displays the results. The model does a very good job at predicting
the change in transport costs during this period, explaining 97% of the change in transport costs.
Most importantly, the model outperforms the 1934 prewar plan, that explains 92% of the variation.
These estimates suggests that the model is able to anticipate which districts became relatively better
connected after the division.
5.5 Alternative factors driving highway choice
International trade and highway choice The main concern that should be addressed to identify
the explanatory power of the division shock for new highway construction are changes in other
factors, in addition to geography, happening right after the division of Germany and affecting the
returns to highway construction unevenly across the West German geography. Factors affecting all
West German regions simultaneously such as the destruction and re-construction of cities after the
Second World War or the decline in the importance of the railway as the main mode of transport for
freight should not bias the estimates presented in the previous subsection. As long as the effect is
mostly constant across all regions, these changes create a level effect that would be differenced out
in the proposed estimation strategy.44
However, changes affecting West German regions in an uneven way could bias the estimation
of the predictive power of the model. One of such factors is the process of European integration
during which tariffs to international trade were eliminated between Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and West Germany. This process started with creation of the European Economic
Community in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Notice that this process of international integration
would increase the incentive to build highways towards the West in the same way in which the
division of Germany would reduce incentives to build highways towards the East. To account for
44Redding and Sturm (2008) show that war-time destruction was uncorrelated with proximity to the new inner
German border
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this, I extend the model to allow for international trade with other West European countries and
solve for the optimal highway construction with both domestic and international trade. The details
about the introduction of international trade in the calibration of the model can be found in section
D of the Appendix. Figure A.7 in the Appendix plots the optimal change in highway construction as
predicted by the model with international trade (above panel) and the observed change in highway
construction between 1950 and 1974 in the data (lower panel).
The results from the model extended with international trade are reported in Table B.7, coun-
terpart of table 4. The optimal highway investment in the model still has good predictive power
for the actual change in highway construction but it predicts a smaller share of the variation in
the data than the model without international trade (the R-squared of column 1 is 13.9% in the
extended model compared to 18.8% in the baseline model). One explanation for why the model
with international trade seems to be further away from the data could be that in the first years of the
european integration process international trade was not so large in magnitude as a share of domestic
activity. In the year 1982, around 85% of all tonnes-kilometres shipped in West Germany by road
were domestic shipments while only 15% were cross-border (international) shipments. However,
the political intention to integrate with other West European countries may explain a part of the
shift of highway investments towards the Western border of Germany, even if the international trade
magnitudes increased very gradually.
Further objectives driving highway choice Additional factors that we could consider are
changes in the industrial composition of West Germany or the shift of the capital from Berlin
to Bonn. Extending the model to account for industrial policy or for the benefits of a change in
the capital city goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, the interplay between infrastructure
policy, industrial policy and the institutional setting is a promising avenue for future research. For
example, Bai and Jia (2018) show how the loss and gain of regional capital status in China was
accompanied by upgrades in the transport network. This change in status resultes in a gain or loss
of centrality of a given city in the transport network, creating a link between the political and the
economic status of the city.
Finally, part of the 1974 followed the 1934 prewar plan. As documented in section 2, while the
first two thousand kilometres of highway built before the division followed the prewar plan, only
half of the highways built after division were constructed following the plan. Further work could be
devoted to understand why the West German government completed part of the 1934 design, rather
than fully optimising the network. In the next session, I quantify the economic impact of highway
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investments in two quantitative exercises. First, I examine the gains from the partial reaction of the
government to the shock, comparing the welfare level for the observed highway network with the
counterfactual of building the 1934 highway Plan. Second, I quantify the cost of rigidities in the
choice of infrastructure, coming from the initial two-thousand highway kilometres built before the
division.
6 Quantification: Gains from flexible choice of highways
In this section, I quantify the aggregate gains of reshaping the infrastructure network. I use the
structural model to perform two policy-relevant counterfactuals.
The first question we seek to answer is whether the choice of highways affected the economic
gains from infrastructure investments. Can governments improve welfare substantially by placing
infrastructure in a sensible way (taking into account the economic geography of the country) or is
infrastructure beneficial for the reduction of transport costs it generates, leading to similar gains even
across different spatial allocations? To understand this, I take a data-driven approach: I quantify
the gains in welfare accomplished by the reshaping of the highway network that took place during
the first decades of the division by the West German government, as documented in the previous
section.
The second question I examine is whether past infrastructure choices persistently affect economic
variables, through path-dependance in infrastructure investments. Infrastructure projects are long-
lived and, therefore, unexpected changes in the economic geography of a country may reduce the
value of the infrastructure network if it becomes obsolete. The construction of the first part of
the 1934 highway Plan and the subsequent division of Germany is an extreme, but clear, example.
In these cases, we would like to know how large are the costs of path-dependence from past
infrastructure construction and how costly is it to overcome these loses. I use the structural model
to solve for the optimal unconstrained highway network for West Germany, without taking into
account construction before the division. I quantify the cost of path-dependence by comparing the
efficient constrained highways, predicted by the model, with the alternative unconstrained highway
network. Both these exercises can help us understand the gains from flexible infrastructure choice.
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6.1 Economic effects of highway choice
To understand the importance of the placement of infrastructure, I compare the observed highway
network in 1974 with the 1934 highway Plan. Comparing the actual highway network in 1974 with
the 1934 Plan has two advantages: First, the counterfactual comes directly from the data, from
the digitised historical map of the proposed 1934 highway Plan. Second, both networks are of
the same length, in terms of highway kilometres. Thus, differences in the aggregate benefits of
these two networks come purely from the reallocation of construction across districts. In this first
counterfactual I use the model as a measuring tool to compute welfare gains from the construction
of the 1934 Highway Plan as well as from the 1974 highway network. Details about the construction
of the model counterpart of the 1934 and 1974 network can be found in section D in the Appendix.
I take as baseline the case of no highways, and compare to it the construction of two alternative
highway networks: the 1934 Highway Plan and the 1974 highway network. The 1934 highway
Plan serves as a counterfactual of the highway network that would have been built if the economic
fundamentals in Germany had remained constant after 1949. I compare the gains of building the
observed 1974 network in two cases, the baseline model with no international trade and the extended
model that allows for trade with Western European countries. The results are reported in figure 10
The government’s reshaping of 1600 kilometres increased welfare by 1.07% relative to building
the 1934 Highway Plan with no adjustments. The gains in terms of real income were of 0.65%
compared to the level under the construction of the 1934 Highway Plan. Panel A shows that the
gains in Welfare and income are driven by a reduction in the Price level and lower average Transport
costs. It is important to notice that these gains are annual increases in aggregate outcomes, that West
German would enjoy every year. Furthermore these gains come purely from the reallocation of the
highway network keeping the budget fixed. The gains from the observed reshaping of infrastructure
are even larger if we consider the potential trade flows with European neighbours, with the gains
increasing to 1.86% in terms of Welfare and 2.02% in terms of income. How much better could the
government have performed? According to Panel B, investing on infrastructure as predicted by the
model would have increase Welfare by 7.5% and real income by 5.659%.
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Figure 10: Economic effects of highway choice
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Notes: The figure plots the gains in welfare and real income from two alternative highway allocations: the
1934 highway Plan and the actual highway network in 1974 under two scenarios, the closed-economy model
(bars 1-4) and the open-economy model (bars 5-8). The gains are measured as a percentage of the welfare
and real income level in the economy under the assumption of having zero kilometres of highways built.
The gains from reshaping infrastructure can also be found when looking at other indicators such
as trade openness by district and inequality.
6.2 The cost of path-dependence
Finally, this set-up allows me to quantify the costs of rigidities in the construction of infrastructure
networks. This cost will appear if the placement of past infrastructure investments conditions the
placement of future investments, meaning that the initial investments constitute the initial conditions
of the next period’s construction. The construction of the German highway network started in the
1930s when the division could not be anticipated. This setting is perfect to evaluate the cost of
outdated transport infrastructure in terms of aggregate welfare.
To understand whether these initial investments created path-dependence on future construction,
I use the calibrated model. I use the model to solve for the unconstrained infrastructure allocation in
West Germany by assuming that no highway had been built before division. This solution represents
the efficient allocation of highways that would maximise aggregate welfare if the West German
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government could have chosen the total infrastructure allocation after the division, taking into
account the new geography of the country. The investment solution found in the unconstrained
case does not coincide with the solution found in 5 for the constrained case. This finding confirms
that the initial highways built between 1934 and 1949 constrained the choice of the West German
government and affected the placement of new investments. To quantify the cost of these initial
investments, I compare the aggregate welfare level of the economy under the efficient unconstrained
network with the welfare level under the constrained network, that includes the highways built
pre-division.
Figure 11 reports the quantification results. As in the previous quantification exercise, results
are reported as a percentage of the welfare and real income levels in the no highways case. I
include the welfare and real income gains under the 1974 highway network as a reference. The
model-generated highway allocations deliver higher aggregate outcomes. This is expected since the
model is a simplification of reality that ignores alternative factors for highway allocation that may
be present in the data. Therefore, the high gains predicted by these two counterfactual networks
should be taken with a grain of salt. However, given that these additional factors not accounted
for tin the model are ignored in both alternative scenarios, the constrained and the unconstrained,
I expect a similar bias in both of them. Thus, even if we may not trust the total magnitude of the
aggregate gains from these counterfactual networks, we can learn something about the differences
between the two networks.
Taking the differences allows us to focus on the relative performance of the unconstrained versus
the constrained networks, abstracting from the level. In the difference we see that the efficient
constrained allocation delivers aggregate gains that are lower than the efficient unconstrained
allocation. Welfare gains are 1.86% lower and real income gains are 1.82% lower, relative to the
welfare and income levels in the case of zero highway investments. Notice that, while this seem
small magnitudes, they represent a large part of the total gains expected from the 1974 network. The
cost of path-dependance represents 12% of the total welfare gains from the 1974 highway network
and 22% of the real income gains from the 1974 highway network.
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Figure 11: Economic costs of path-dependence in infrastructure
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Notes: The figure plots the gains in welfare and real income from two alternative highway allocations: the
constrained allocation case (pre-division highways taken as given in the solution) and the unconstrained
allocation case (no initial constrains in the solution). The gains are measured as a percentage of the welfare
and real income level in the economy under the assumption of having zero kilometres of highways built.
6.3 Discussion of results
Finally, let us put in perspective the different welfare and real income gains associated with the
different counterfactual networks. The quantifications so far were considering the aggregate gains of
different highway network allocations of the same length. As we could see, there are considerable
gains from different infrastructure investment patterns.
What are the aggregate economic gains of infrastructure construction? Taking as baseline the
1974 highway network, I find that eliminating all highways would cause Welfare to fall by 13.8%
and real GDP by 8%. As we mentioned before, if we change the 1974 Highway network by the
1934 Highway Plan, Welfare to fall by 1% and real GDP by 0.65%, thus by about 10% of the total
gains from building the 1974 highway network. This shows that the government’s response to the
division increased the gains from highway construction by a large magnitude. However, the gains
could have been larger, going from the 1974 highways to the Optimal constrained network would
increase welfare by 12.2% and real GDP by 8%. Figure A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix plots the level
of aggregate gains for all the counterfactual networks for the before division period, upper panel,
and for the post division period, lower panel.
The magnitudes found in this quantification depend on the calibration of the parameters of the
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model. The last exercise I do is to put bounds on the reshaping gains by looking at different values
of two very important parameters: the trade elasticity σ and the returns to highway investments γ45.
Table 5 summarises the results. As we can see, the estimates reported below may fall or increase
slightly but it seems clear that there are positive welfare gains from reshaping infrastructure and
negative costs of path-dependence, since the intervals are far away from zero.
Table 5: Welfare Gains: Bounds
Welfare Gains Min Max Bounds for γ = {0.5, 1} Bounds for σ = {6, 8.5}
σ=7 γ=0.84
Reshaping highways 0.68 1.44 (0.84, 1.11) (0.81, 1.32)
Path dependence 0.69 1.62 (0.97, 1.52) (1.31, 1.60)
7 Conclusion
Understanding how the placement of infrastructure affects the economic gains from infrastructure
investments is essential for policy-makers to take informed decisions. However, the endogeneity
between infrastructure investments and economic outcomes is an important challenge to common
empirical and quantitative methods. The reduced-form approach of exploiting exogenous variation
in infrastructure construction is appealing to estimate local effects but cannot be employed to
quantify the aggregate effects of infrastructure projects.
In this paper I take a structural approach to this problem by building a quantitative spatial trade
framework with endogenous infrastructure investments. In the model, a government decides how
to allocate investments across regions to maximise aggregate welfare. This framework allows me
to characterise the optimal infrastructure network, calibrate the model using historical data and
estimate the key structural parameter, the returns to highway investments, taking into account the
endogeneity of infrastructure.
I use the calibrated model to study the economic impact of highway construction in the context
of the division of Germany. The division of Germany provides an ideal set-up to test the ability
of the model to predict highway construction after the division and to estimate the gains from
reshaping the network in response to the shock. Using newly digitised data, I document that half of
the highway kilometres built after the division, between 1950 and 1974, deviated from the initial
45For σ I consider the extremes of the confidence interval estimated when calibrating the trade elasticity using trade
flows. For γ I consider 0.5 and 1, following Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2018)
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prewar Highway Plan. I find that the reallocation of these investments (one third of the network) led
to increases of 1.24% of welfare and 0.69% of real income annually, keeping the budget fixed. In the
extended model with international trade, the gains are even larger: the new 1974 highway network
increased welfare by 1.8% and real income by 2%. Finally, I measure the cost of path-dependence
and show that reshaping the full network could have increased welfare by 1.86% and real income
by 1.85%.
The magnitude of these reshaping gains is large relative to current estimates in the literature.
For example Asturias et al. (2014) find gains of 2.7% of real income from the construction of the
Indian highway network of almost six thousand kilometres and Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017)
find welfare gains of between 0.9% and 1.5% from reshaping the totality of nowadays Germany’s
highway network.
There are two main differences between my paper and other studies. First, I examine the gains
from reacting to a change in economic fundamentals. My findings suggest that the economic
impact of infrastructure is larger in this case than when evaluating the impact of infrastructure
investments in the presence of stable economic fundamentals. Second, my results are estimated from
the construction of the initial part of the highway network. It is likely that returns to investments
decrease as infrastructure is accumulated. However, these differences make my results particularly
relevant for countries that are going through structural reforms or large policy changes and for
countries building the first stages of the infrastructure network. Making use of a quantitative
framework like the one developed in this paper can help governments quantify the expected gains
across different investment allocations.
There are several related questions that need to be addressed in relation with infrastructure
choice more generally. First, what other factors shape the investment decisions of governments? The
importance of political factors can be estimated with a framework of endogenous infrastructure that
includes economic fundamentals and political incentives. Second, how does the optimal network
decision change with the introduction of additional mechanisms such as intermediate input usage,
heterogeneous agents or international trade? Finally, what is the optimal infrastructure policy to
address different spatial settings such as fast-urbanising countries or deeply integrated free-trade
areas? Expanding this framework in the mentioned directions is left for future research.
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A Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Goods traffic by transport mode
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Note: Values are for West Germany, collected by author from Statistical Yearbook of the
Bundesrepublik, multple years. Values for missing years are interpolated.
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Figure A.2: Evolution of the German highway network
Notes: German highway data collected from Michelin Atlases of the years 1950, 1964, 1975, 1980 and 1989
digitised by the author.
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Figure A.3: Construction and Planning of the Highway Network
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Figure A.4: Representative transport network and corresponding graph
A) Chosen network
B) Graph
Notes: Panel A shows the roads that I choose to build the grid. This network connects all
districts while the number of links remains small. Highways are the darkest lines, federal
highways are the intermediate lines, and local roads are the thinnest lines. Panel B shows the
discretisation of the network in panel A. Each dot represents a vertex, and each line represents
an edge of the network.
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Figure A.5: Share of investments by district: model vs data
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46: The figure plots the share of investment in each district of the total budget
(model) and of the total length of the prewar Plan (1934 plan). The model is
depicted in red, while the data from the plan is depicted in grey.
58
Figure A.6: Simulated Infrastructure before the Division shock - Timing of Construction
Notes: The shading represents the investment allocation by district, in terms of kilometres. The model
predicts the optimal allocation of the investment budget to each district, as a share of the budget. I convert
the share of investment into highway kilometres by assuming that the total number of kilometres built in the
model is the same as in the 1934 Highway plan. The black lines represent the highways that had been built
by 1946.
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Figure A.7: Simulated Infrastructure investments after Division - International trade
A) Model (International trade)
B) Data (1974-1950)
Notes: The shading represents the change in investment allocation by district. The upper panel displays the
changes predicted by the model while the lower panel represents the highway changes observed in the data
(new highway construction between 1950 and 1974). Darker shades indicate higher highway construction.60
Figure A.8: Gains from Infrastructure Investments
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Figure A.9: Gains from Infrastructure Investments
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B Additional Tables
Table B.1: Elasticity of trade flows to distance
Outcome: Log (Road shipments in tons) (1) (2)
DATA 1938 MODEL (σ = 7)
Log(Distance) -2.8674*** -2.7808***
(0.2381) (0.3762)
Constant 28.7349*** 35.9057***
(1.4651) (2.3151)
Observations 13 13
R2 0.929 0.832
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors, are in parentheses. Regression run using total tons shipped by truck
by manufacturing firms over 13 distance brackets ( from less than 50km to more than 1000km).
Model regression using simulated trade data given parameter values and infrastructure in 1938
aggregated over the same distance brackets
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Table B.2: Choice of Parameters
Parameter Description Source/Target Value
From Literature
ε Shape parameter of Fréchet Monte et al. (2015) 3
α Share of tradables Redding, Sturm (2008) 0.7
1938 Germany
{Ai} Productivity parameter Match population 1938
{Hi} Land supply Area in sqkm
σ Elasticity of substitution Trade elasticity 1938 7
Infrastructure
γ Returns to highway investments Concentration in 1934 Plan 0.84
Z Budget of Government Average km in Plan 1.5*regions
c Marginal cost - 1
Division Shock
Bi, j Cost of Border East Ger.-West Ger. Prohibitive trade costs ∞
Notes: Further details about the calibration and estimation of the parameters can be found in section 4 in the main text and
in section D of this Appendix.
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Table B.3: 1934 Highway Plan : Cross-sectional variation
OUTCOME: Highway km Plan Highway km Plan Highway km Plan
(1) (2) (3)
Optimal highway km 0.4496*** 0.3213*** 0.3285***
(0.0675) (0.0566) (0.0583)
Pop 1938 3.8656** 4.6497*
(1.6137) (2.3317)
Distance to the Border 0.0576** 0.0578**
(0.0244) (0.0241)
Elevation -0.0033 -0.0169
(0.0080) (0.0104)
Area (sqkm) 0.0115*** 0.0117***
(0.0027) (0.0021)
Constant 10.2302*** -48.3552** -44.0867
(1.7620) (20.3512) (34.0212)
State FE No No Yes
Observations 331 323 323
R2 0.265 0.381 0.451
Mean Highway km 20
SD Highway km 24
Notes: Standard errors clustered at Government Region level, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** signif-
icant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Results for the 331 German districts. The dependent variable is the number
of highway kilometres in the 1934 Plan for each district. Optimal highway km is the highway kilometres pre-
dicted by the quantitative model. Distance to West Border measures the distance from the district centroid to
the German border with a western European country.
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Table B.4: 1934 Highway Plan : Change in Transport Costs
OUTCOME Transport cost Transport cost Transport cost ∆ TC
1934 Plan 1934 Plan (1934 Plan) (Plan-1938)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1938 Transport costs 0.5272*** 0.2954***
(0.0012) (0.0022)
Optimal Transport costs 2.2899*** 1.1600***
(0.0052) (0.0097)
∆ TC Optimal 0.6016***
(0.0014)
Constant 0.2592*** -1.4559*** -0.7011*** -0.2166***
(0.0032) (0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0019)
Observations 77246 77246 77246 77246
R2 0.724 0.713 0.767 0.716
Mean dep. var 1.62
SD dep. var 0.512
Notes: Standard errors, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. . Results for
the 395 German districts aggregated at the micro-region level. The dependent variable is the level of bilateral Transport costs
under the counterfactual construction of the 1934 Highway Plan or the change in bilateral transport costs between 1938 and the
construction of the 1834 Plan. OptimalTransportCosts is the ad-valorem transport cost computed under the optimal investment
predicted by the model. 1938TransportCosts measures ad-valorem transport costs under the 1938 network. ∆TCOptimal is
the difference between Optimal and 1938 transport costs.
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Table B.5: Change in highway construction: Highway kilometres
∆ Kilometres ∆ Kilometres ∆ Kilometres
(1974 − 1950) (1974 − 1950) (1974 − 1950)
(1) (2) (3)
Optimal change in Kilometres 0.4101*** 0.3628*** 0.3295***
(0.1180) (0.0896) (0.1019)
Distance to West Border -0.0184 -0.0196
(0.0132) (0.0199)
Area (sqkm) 0.0087*** 0.0096***
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Constant 7.1523*** 1.4961
(1.7108) (3.7236)
State FE No No Yes
Observations 258 258 258
R2 0.188 0.243 0.475
Notes: Standard errors clustered at Government Region level, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Results for the 258 West German districts. The dependent variable is the change in
highway kilometres between 1950, the end of the Division and 1974. Optimal change km is the predicted increase
in highway kilometres simulated in the quantitative model. highways built. Distance to West Border measures the
distance from the district centroid to the German border with a western European country.
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Table B.6: Change in Highway construction: Transport Costs
OUTCOME Transport cost Transport cost ∆ TC ∆ TC
1974 1974 (1974-1950) (1974-1950)
(1) (2)
∆ Transport Cost Model 0.7368***
(0.0004)
∆ Transport Cost 1934 Plan 0.9768***
(0.0009)
Constant -0.0384*** -0.0746***
(0.0006) (0.0010)
Observations 96721 96721
R2 0.970 0.923
Mean dep. var 1.75
SD dep. var 0.45
Notes: Standard errors, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. . Results for the 312
West German districts aggregated at the micro-region level. The dependent variable is the change in bilateral ad-valorem transport
cost between 1950 and 1974. TransportCostsOptimal is the ad-valorem transport cost computed under the optimal investment pre-
dicted by the model. TransportCosts1950 measures ad-valorem transport costs under the 1950 network and TransportCosts1934
under the (counterfactual) construction of the 1934 Highway Plan. ∆TCOptimal is the difference between Optimal and 1950
transport costs while ∆TCPlan is the difference between Transport costs in the 1934 Plan and 1950.
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Table B.7: Change in highway construction: Model with International
Trade
OUTCOME ∆ Kilometres ∆ Kilometres ∆ Kilometres
(1974 − 1950) (1974 − 1950) (1974 − 1950)
(1) (2) (3)
Optimal change in km 0.3352*** 0.2026*** 0.2065***
(0.0875) (0.0551) (0.0595)
Log Pop 1950 4.6325*** 4.3295**
(1.7236) (1.9214)
Distance to West Border -0.0263** -0.0266**
(0.0112) (0.0135)
Area (sqkm) 0.0038 0.0043
(0.0026) (0.0026)
Elevation -0.0022 -0.0053
(0.0037) (0.0064)
Plan 1934 km 0.4118*** 0.4077***
(0.0707) (0.0743)
Constant 7.9858*** -52.3630*** -39.9075
(1.0721) (20.1133) (25.8030)
State FE No No Yes
Observations 258 257 257
R2 0.139 0.436 0.442
Notes: Robust HAC standard errors, are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. Results for the 258 West German districts. The dependent variable is the change in
highway kilometres between 1950, the end of the Division and 1974. Optimal change km is the predicted
increase in highway kilometres simulated in the quantitative model. highways built. Distance to West Border
measures the distance from the district centroid to the German border with a western European country.
C Theoretical Appendix
C.1 A model of trade with endogenous infrastructure investments: No housing
In this section I describe in detail the model presented in section 3. The model features costly trade
across many domestic districts, i = 1...N, endowed with an exogenous productivity, Ai. There is a
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measure L of workers that move across districts according to their own heterogenous preferences.
This model builds on the family of widely used quantitative spatial models reviewed by Redding
and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and is specially close to Redding (2016). The main contribution of
my theoretical framework is to embed the spatial equilibrium framework in the decision of a
Government whose goal is to choose the optimal infrastructure investments to maximise aggregate
welfare. The consumption, production and location decisions of consumers and workers are standard.
The model, however, features a realistic geography where transport costs are determined as the
solution to the problem of shipping across a grid of districts at the minimum cost.
Preferences The preferences of each worker are given by two components. First, a heterogenous
preference taste (b), that represents how much a given worker values a given location (Redding
(2016)). Second, a consumption component (C) that can be represented by a canonical CES demand
system, with every agent choosing the level of consumption of each of the varieties available with a
constant elasticity of substitution across varieties of σ. Specifically, the utility function of an agent
ω living in district n is given by:
Un = bn(ω)
(Cn
α
)
(29)
where Cn =
[∑N
j
∑M
ν c jn(ν)
σ−1
σ
] σ
(σ−1) , is the consumption basket chosen by workers living in district
n, c jn(ν) is the consumption of a worker that lives in district n of variety ν produced in district
j47. M is the number of available varieties in the economy. The price index associated with the
tradable varieties aggregator Cn is Pn =
[∑N
j
∑M
ν p jn(ν)
1−σ] 1(1−σ) , where p jn(ν) is the price in district
n of variety ν produced in district j. The taste component bn(ω) is an idiosyncratic taste preference.
Each worker draws a vector of N realisations {bn(ω)}n=1...N from a Frechet distribution that governs
the individual preferences for each district:
Gn(b) = [Pr(bn(ω) ≤ b)] = e−b− (30)
where  is the shape parameter governing the dispersion of tastes across workers for each location.
A large  implies a low dispersion (low standard deviation). Less dispersion means that the
idiosyncratic preferences are more equal across districts for all workers. In this case a small
difference across districts will trigger big movements in population. In the limit,  → all workers
behave identically. They become indifferent between locations and the model collapses to the
perfectly mobile labour case because all districts are perceived as equally desirable and tiny changes
47Notice that workers living in n face the same consumption prices and earn the same wage so they make the same
consumption choices
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in wages trigger large population reallocations. When  → 1, highest dispersion, workers are very
heterogeneous in their taste. This means that large differences in district-level outcomes are needed
to make workers move from their preferred choices. In this type of models the labour supply in a
district is upward slopping in the wage.
To keep the number of parameters of the model low and due to data limitations I abstract from
consumption of housing in the model. The existence of heterogenous preferences will act as a
dispersion force through wages and, under certain parameter values, the existence of the equilibrium
will be unique and stable.
Production Production uses labour as only factor of production, happens within firms and takes
the form of monopolistic competition. There is a fixed cost to pay to start production, F, but once a
firm enters the market it will produce a differentiated variety. The existence of the fixed cost and
free entry ensures that each variety will only be produced by one firm. This means that each district
will produce a specific and unique set of varieties that will equal the sum of varieties produced by
the firms in that district. All varieties are produced with the same technology that is district-specific,
Ai. From the firm’s profit maximisation we know that a firm producing a variety ν in location i
will set a price pi = µwiAi where µ is the mark-up charged over the price µ =
σ
σ−1 . Notice that the
price is constant across varieties produced in the same district. As we can see, each agent in the
economy is endowed with one unit of labor that is supplied inelastically to produce Ai units of the
district-specific varieties. I assume there is only one sector in the whole economy. The existence of
free entry in each location drives down profits to zero and will pin-down the size of a firm in each
district:
qFi (ν) =
F ∗ Ai
(µ − 1) = Ai(σ − 1)F (31)
As we can see more productive districts will have larger firms because they will be able to cover the
fixed cost more easily. Given the scale of each firm and the local labour supply, the labour market
clearing condition pins down the number of varieties (equal the number of firms) in each district:
Mi =
Li
σF
(32)
Again, we see that larger districts will produce a larger number of varieties. Therefore, the
productivity of a district determines the scale of its firms and the size of a district determines the
number of varieties locally produced. Finally, we can re-write the optimal price index of tradables
Pi in terms of the local price and the number of varieties produced in each district, taking into
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account that all varieties in a given location have the same price and substituting the number of
varieties in each district:
Pn =
1
σF
 N∑
j
L jp1−σjn

1
(1−σ)
(33)
The price index in a district will depend on the local prices of imported varieties with larger regions
exporting a larger share and therefore having a higher weight on the price index.
Location and Consumption choices Given the specification of preferences, we can write the
indirect utility function of worker ω in district n as
vn(ω) =
bn(ω)wn
Pn
(34)
Since indirect utility is a monotonic function of the idiosyncratic preference draw, it has a Frechet
distribution too:
Gn(u) = Pr[Un ≤ u] = e−Ψnu (35)
where Ψn = ( vnPn )
 . Gn(u) is the distribution of indirect utility realisations in district n.
Each worker chooses the location that maximises her indirect utility. Using the properties of the
Frechet distribution we find that the probability that a worker chooses to live in district n:
pin = Pr[Un ≥ max{Us; s , n}] =
∫ 1
0
∏
s,n
[1 −Gn(U)]︸             ︷︷             ︸
Pr(Us<u),s,i
dGn(U)︸  ︷︷  ︸
cdf Un
=
(wnPn )
∑
k(
wk
Pk
)
(36)
The fraction of workers that choose to live in district n coincides with the probability that any given
worker chooses n:
Ln =
(wnPn )
∑N
k=1(wk/(Pk))
L (37)
As we can see  is the elasticity of the labour share in any district to changes in real income income
in that district wn/Pn. Workers are more likely to choose districts with a relatively high real income.
Consumption is determined by the CES preference structure over varieties. The demand for
variety ν produced in district i and consumed in district n is:
xi,n(ν) =
p1−σi,n
P1−σn
wnLn (38)
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where Pn = 1σF (
∑
k Lkp1−σk,n )
1/(1−σ) is the price index of consumption goods in district n and wnLn is
the total expenditure in district n. Because each district produces a different set of varieties, the
demand in district n for goods produced in district i (import share) will be:
Xi,n =
Li
σF
p1−σi,n
P1−σn
wnLn (39)
A district will import less goods from more expensive destinations (high pi) and will import more
goods from other districts, relative to domestic consumption, if it is more expensive (has a high
Price index Pn). The above expression displays the Home market effect from the Krugman (1980)
model: A larger district (high population) will produced a larger share of varieties and therefore
export larger shares to other districts (notice that trade share Xin is increasing in Ln).
Finally, applying the same steps as before, we can compute the expected utility for each worker
ex ante that is equal to the utility of the economy as a whole, ex post:
E(U) = Γ
(

 − 1
)  N∑
1
(wn/(Pn))
1/ (40)
Geography The set of N districts can be thought of as located in a two-dimensional grid where
each square represents a different district and we let the population be concentrated in the centre
of the square. A more complex geography will be introduced in the calibration exercise. I define
the size of district i, Di, as the length of side of the square representing the region. We assume, as
mentioned, that all the population is located in the centroid of the district and all the production
happens there.
Given the dispersion of production and population across the grid, there are ad-valorem type
of transport costs associated with the consumption of non-locally produced varieties. The price of
variety i consumed in district n is given by:
pi,n = piBi,nTi,n(D,Φ) (41)
The transport friction Ti,n(D,Φ) depends on two variables: {D} and {Φ}. The vector {D} represents
the size of each district in geographical terms while {Φ} represents the level of infrastructure in each
district. Finally, the vector {B}i,n denotes the border friction between districts i and n that will be
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defined by:
Bi,n =
1 if i, n are within the same border> 1, if i, n are separated by a border (42)
Transport Costs The transport cost that has to be paid to move a good produced in district i to be
consumed in district n will be given by the minimum possible transport cost that can be realized
when shipping between i and n. Therefore, the transport cost matrix will be the collection of the
transport costs along the least cost path between each district pair. This set-up is similar to assuming
the existence of some shadow transport sector that is driven by profit-maximization, and thus, ships
goods at the minimum costs (see Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017)). The transport cost minimization
problem will consider both geography, D, that determines the distance that has to be covered in a
given trip, and the quality of infrastructure, Φ, that will determine how costly (fast) can we cover
this distance. While geographic distances are exogenous, infrastructure is endogenous, and can be
upgraded to reduce transport frictions. A further simplifying assumption I make is that the quality
of infrastructure is homogeneous within a district48. These two variables, distance and infrastructure
quality, define the cost of shipping some good across district i as follows:
Cost of transitingi =
Di
φ
γ
i
(43)
where I use φi to denote the district-level infrastructure and Φ to denote the vector of infrastructure
allocations. I assume that φ j ≥1, so that the transport cost cannot be larger than the geographical
cost but will be always bounded above by the physical geography49. The elasticity of the ad-valorem
transit cost to the infrastructure investments is denoted by γ, that is model-specific and I assume it
to be ∈ (0, 1). This restriction ensures that there are decreasing returns to infrastructure and that the
marginal benefit of infrastructure investments is concave.
As we can see, a higher quality of infrastructure will reduce the size of a district in terms of the
ad valorem cost that is incurred in the transit. The elasticity of the shipping cost across district i to a
marginal change in the level of quality of infrastructure Φi is −γ. In the quantitative exercise {Φ} is
the quality of the road (highway, state highway or local road) and will affect shipping cost because
48In the real world a district may have one very high quality highway and one very low quality road. Therefore, we
may think of φi as the average quality of the infrastructure stock in district i. Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) adopt the
decision of defining the quality of infrastructure for every link but this implies solving the optimal investment for every
link rather than keeping the district as the unit of analysis
49This is a very reasonable assumption in the context of land-shipping because there is always some residual way to
go from one region to another even in the absence of roads (i.e. across the fields)
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of the different maximum speeds at which each road can be transited.
Optimal path matrix The solution to the least cost path problem to connect each district-pair
will depend on distance, D, and the quality of infrastructure, Φ. For some given geography and
a given level of infrastructure investment in each district this solution can be expressed using an
optimal path matrix. This matrix indicates whether district i is a transit district for all the other
district-pairs along their optimal cost path. It is similar to the transition matrix in the network
literature as it indicates how to transition from one node of the network to any other. The element
Πio,d ∈ Πi indicates whether district i is relevant for the determination of the cost of shipping from
district o to district d and is defined as:
Πio,d =
1, if i is a transit district in the path between o and d0, if i is not a transit district in the path between o and d (44)
I can now define the transport cost To,d between any two districts o and d as
To,d =
∑
i
Πio,d
Di
φ
γ
i
 (45)
where φi is the infrastructure level in district i and it reduces the travelling time across district i
with an elasticity of −γ. This expression means that the cost of shipping a good from o to d will
be the sum of the geographical distance scaled by the infrastructure quality of all the districts that
have to be transited to reach destination d from origin o. Given that we have defined { Πi } as the
optimal path matrix this implies that we can also express the transport friction between o and d as
To,d = mink(T (pko,p)) where T (p
k
o,p) is the transport cost of shipping a good from o to d along path k.
Finally, I adopt a normalisation common to all trade models by assuming Ti,i = 1, equivalent
to assuming free intra-district trade and normalising the cost of trading out of the district by the
internal shipping cost.
C.2 Spatial equilibrium
The spatial equilibrium is given by the clearing of the goods market at the equilibrium wages and
the clearing of the labour market so that the expected utility for all workers is equalized. The goods
market clearing implies that the income of each district has to equalise the total exports of that
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district (assuming trade is balanced):
wiLi =
∑
j
Li
σF
(
σ
σ − 1
wi
Ai
bi, jTi, j
)1−σ
(P j)σ−1w jL j,∀i ∈ N (46)
where the Price index in each region will be:
P1−σi =
∑
j
L j
σF
(
σ
σ − 1
w j
A j
b j,iT j,i
)1−σ
,∀i ∈ N (47)
The utility equalisation condition will hold when the labour share in each district n is given by:
Ln
L
=
(wnPn )
∑N
n=1(wn/(Pn))
(48)
The labour market clearing implies that the sum of labour in each district will add up to the
total number of workers:
∑
n
Ln
L = 1. These conditions determine the equilibrium value of wages,
labour shares and the equilibrium welfare given by expected utility E(U), equation 40. As shown in
Allen and Arkolakis (2014) the condition for the existence and uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium
will hold if the elasticity of expected utility to the labour share in a district is negative, this is, if
the dispersion forces are stronger than the agglomeration forces of the model. Specifically, the
condition for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with imperfect mobility of labour is
σ
1 − 1
1 + 1

 > 1 (49)
I calibrate the parameters so that the equilibrium is unique and stable.
D Quantification details
D.1 Quantification of the model before Division
Initial transport network We have 3 types of roads in Germany in 1938: Highways, Federal
Highways and Local roads. To construct the initial transport grid I choose the smallest set of edges
and vertices that allows me to represent the underlying geography of Germany to transport goods.
First I select the set of vertices to represent the 412 German districts I observe in the data. I choose
as the vertex of the district the centroid of the path of any highways that transits the district. If there
is no highway in the district I use the centroid of the federal highway inside the district. If there are
no highways or federal highways I use the centroid of the local road. Second I build the set of edges
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Table D.1: Cost of time and distance of truck shipping (France, 1978)
Highway (Autobahn) Federal Highway Local road
Speed (km per hour) 80 60 40
Cost of distance (Euros) 85.8 89.8 97.18
Cost of time (Euros) 5.4 5.4 5.4
that connects the vertices that represent the population centres. To do this I select all highways and
federal highways that existed in 1938. I add the set of local roads needed to connect the remaining
vertices that do not have highway access.50
Finally, I export the network to use in my quantitative analysis. The resulting network is
composed of 1071 junctions (nodes), collected into 412 districts) and around 1200 edges (links) that
can be exported as two vectors: one containing the links and one containing the cost of transiting
each link (called weight in the networks literature).
Initial transport costs To compute the initial transport cost matrix I follow Combes and Lafour-
cade (2005) transport cost function. The function is derived to account for the cost of shipping one
truck full of goods in France in the decade of 1978. The transport cost specification for shipping a
truck between i and n is:
ti,n = Distance cost ×
speedi,n
lengthi,n
+ Time cost × speedi,n
lengthi,n
. (50)
The table below represents the speed and costs assumed by Combes and Lafourcade (2005) that I
use in the computation. I use this function to compute the cost of shipping one truck worth of goods
for each link in the network using the length in kilometres along the underlying German network in
1938. I assume links with local roads can be transited at 40 kilometres per hour, link with federal
highways at 60 kilometres per hour and links with autobahns at 80 kilometres per hour. Even if
there was no speed limit in Germany for highways trucks can rarely go faster than 80 km/h. I use
the Network Analyst toolbox in ArcGIS to construct the network that is then exported to MATLAB.
I compute cost of transit in each link using the above function and the actual kilometres. I use
50To select this edges I choose the least cost path to connect each of the 57 districts that are not transited by a highway
or a federal road to the closest district with federal highway using the ”Closest facility Tool” in ArcGIS that allows you
to extract the path chosen to connect facilities (federal highway points) to incidents (district centroids). Local roads are
used as the default way to more around to prevent any transport costs to be zero. Instead of manually recovering the
local road network in 1938 I use the 2004 digitised map of local roads and enabled a truck to move through these links
at 40 km per hour.
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the least-cost path algorithm to compute the matrix of initial transport costs in euros. To convert
this measure to ad-valorem quantities I normalise the computed cost in euros by 28,000 euros that
is the average cost of a truck full of German goods in the year 1995. This computation uses the
average export price per ton from Germany to France. This normalisation ensures that the transport
cost matrix expresses the cost of shipping one unit of the average German good across any district
pair in ad-valorem terms.
D.2 Optimal infrastructure network
Estimation of parameter γ I estimate γ to match the skewness of investments in the 1934
highway plan. Skewness is a measure of the concentration of a distribution. Matching this moment
ensures that the concentration of highway investments in the model is aligned with the data. I use
the Simulated Method of Moments for the estimation. I simulate 100 times the optimal choice of
infrastructure in a representative 50-district economy with 100 different random draws of the vector
of district-specific productivities. I compute the skewness of these investments and estimate the
value of γ that minimises the sum of squared differences between average skewness in the model
and skewness in the data. Skewness in the data is 1.5. For the simulation I specify the productivity
distribution as a Pareto distribution with shape parameter αp = 1.6, estimated from the calibrated
productivity distribution for Germany, scale parameter σp = 1 and location parameter θp = 0.This
procedure yields an estimate of γ = 0.84.
D.3 Optimal infrastructure network with International Trade
To introduce international trade post-Division I consider trade with Belgium, France and Netherlands.
I assume that trade with the rest of the world is only possible through the West German districts
located in the border with these countries for which some highway had been designed in the prewar
Highway Plan or for which some local road existed.
To model the new trading opportunities I choose to increase the population of the bordering regions
with a share of the foreign population, so that access to these bordering regions allows a firm to sell
products to the domestic population and to the foreign population as well. I assume that trade is
possible with the whole population in the foreign countries but I compute a cost of trading with these
foreign population equal to the average distance between the German border and the main foreign
cities/capital city (for Belgium and Netherlands). I reduce the accessible population by a share to
account for this distance cost. This simplifying assumption of considering trade opportunities as an
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increase in the size of regions at the border allows me to follow the same calibration strategy as
before: I re-calibrate the productivity vector to match the new population distribution where the
bordering regions have been allocated extra population coming from the foreign countries. The rest
of the calibration procedure is the same as described previously.
D.4 Counterfactual exercises
Taking the highway network to the model To construct the model counterpart of the 1974
highway allocation I follow two steps. First, I compute the district share of highway kilometres.
This is obtained by dividing the total highway kilometres in a district by the total highway kilometres
built in 1974 in West Germany. Then, I multiply the highway share by the total budget allocated in
the model to the Post-Division network, as follows:
φi = 1 + share74 ∗ (Z − 312), (51)
where I subtract 312 from Z because that is the lower bound imposed by the requirement that
highway investments cannot increase the transport costs and
share74 =
Highway kmi,1974∑N
i Highway kmi,1974
. (52)
In the same way, I build the counterpart of the 1934 plan as
φi = 1 + sharePlan ∗ (Z − 312), (53)
E Data Appendix
Highway data The highway network data (Autobahns) collected for the empirical exercise is of
two types. First, I digitise the highway network plan of 1934 from historical documents. From
the digitised data I construct a district level measure of the number of kilometres that the 1934
highway plan allocated to each district. Besides, I collect data of the actual highway network (only
Autobahn) in Germany (both East and West Germany) for the years 1938, 1950, 1965, 1974, 1980
and 1989. This information is obtained from different road atlases and historical maps and geo-
referenced using the software ArcGIS. Once the maps and atlases are digitised I manually collect
the data to construct the highway network in each period. Additionally, I collect and geo-reference
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the pattern of federal roads in 1950 and 1965. Federal roads (Bundesstrase) are decided by the
central government but are not restricted-access roads like the Autobahns and the network was
developed earlier than the highway network. Finally, the network of local roads is imported from
the EuroGlobal map by Eurographics that provides harmonised European open geographical data
covering 45 countries and territories in the European region and is freely available. The website
address of Eurographics is https://eurogeographics.org.
Economic outcomes As economic outcomes, I use population data by decade at the district level
from the historical census. I also collect employment level at the district level from the historical
census, available for some aggregated sectors.
Additionally, I collect traffic of goods by road for 18 aggregated traffic districts in Germany.
The traffic data is collected in tons and reported in an aggregated way (Total tons of goods
sent to the rest of Germany and received from Germany). The traffic data is collected from
the "Statistisches Jahrbuch fr das Deutsche Reich". I use data from the year 1938, the clos-
est to the beginning of the construction of the highway network. The scanned photocopies
of the annual editions of the "Statistisches Jahrbuch fr das Deutsche Reich" are available at
http://www.digizeitschriften.de/dms/toc/?PID=PPN514401303.
Finally, I collect and digitise traffic of goods by road between West German states. This data
is available only after 1960 (most recent data I found was 1966). The traffic data is collected
in tons and reported in an aggregated way (Total tons of goods sent to each state and received
from each state in West Germany). This traffic data is collected and digitised from the "West
Germany Road freight transport 1945- Statistics Serials" (Der Fernverkehr mit Lastkraftfahrzeugen:
Zusammengefasste bersichten zur Gterbewegung).
Geographic variables As controls, I collect a series of measures related to the geography of
Germany such as area of districts and distance to relevant points such as the inner German border.
First, I measure the distance from each district to the closest point of the inner German border, to
the closest point to the external West German border and West Berlin. I calculate these distances
from the centre of each district to the geographic feature of interest over a straight line. Furthermore,
I compute the distance to West Berlin through the transport network in 1950. Finally, I collect the
district area in square kilometres.
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